1   Introduction: integrating the study of order, conflict, and violence

Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud

There might appear to be little that binds the study of order and the study of violence and conflict. Bloodshed in its multiple forms – interstate war, civil conflict, crime – is often seen as something separate from, and almost unrelated to, the domains of "normal" politics that constitute what we think of as order. Students of political, social, and economic institutions simply assume that violence is absent and order established, never considering that the maintenance of such institutions might involve the ongoing management of conflict and the more or less direct threat of violence. Likewise, students of violence and conflict tend to focus on places and periods in which order has collapsed, rarely considering how violence is used to create order at the national and local levels, maintain it, and uphold it in the face of challenges. In Charles Tilly's (1975, 42) famous formulation: war makes states. Clearly, order is necessary for managing violence as much as the threat of violence is crucial in cementing order.

Yet the question of how order emerges and how it is sustained is but the flip side of understanding the dynamics of conflict. On the one hand, order requires the active taming of conflict. However, this is often impossible without an actual or threatened recourse to violence. In game-theoretic language, violence is off the equilibrium path of order.[1] On the other hand, violent conflict entails the successful contestation of existing order, and its collapse. Put otherwise, violence is employed both by those who wish to upend an existing order and by those who want to sustain it.

The lack of integration between the study of order and the study of conflict and violence is in part a natural consequence of disciplinary and

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[1] One is reminded of the famous example (related to us by John Ferejohn) of the two thieves: one mangles his victims before relieving them of their wealth; the other presents his quarry with a choice: "your money or your life?" Though no blood is spilled in the latter scenario – which might even be labeled a voluntary transaction – it is dripping with violence nonetheless. Likewise, much of what we identify as order is simply violence in disguise. Political institutions are often erected on violent foundations, and maintained through implicit and explicit threats of bloodshed should obedience be withheld.

sub-disciplinary barriers that have long separated the various ways of studying human behavior and institutions. Different disciplines operate at different levels of analysis, and focus on different variables and aspects of these phenomena. Sociologists emphasize social control and the deviation from it – crime and *anomie* – while economists point to economic forces under secure and protected property rights. Anthropologists study the lived experiences of individuals and communities primarily under conditions of peace, while psychologists try to uncover the properties of a universal "human mind" under similar conditions. Historical sociologists examine instances of major breakdown (such as revolutions), economists have turned their attention to terrorism and civil wars, as have political scientists who are also exploring medium-range phenomena such as riots and pogroms, while criminologists study "everyday" forms of collapse of order such as crime and "interpersonal violence." Within political science, international relations scholars study cooperation and conflict between states, while comparativists highlight similar processes at the domestic level. The first have made a specialty of the study of interstate war while the latter have focused on the study of civil wars and revolutions.

Differences of focus are reinforced by methodological ones. Some scholars work at the macro level, others at the micro level. Some scholars rely on interviews and archives of historical documents, while others employ statistical analyses or reason deductively from abstract formal models. Furthermore, scholarship on violence and conflict and political order is splintered not just by differences in their substantive focuses, disciplinary boundaries, and the methodological predilections of researchers, but by what appear to be fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of the individual. Studies of violent conflict seem to be populated with individuals who are easily swayed by irrational passions and genocidal ideologies, while studies of order are peopled by reasonable, calculating maximizers of material interests. There are important exceptions to this characterization, of course,[2] but for the most part, students of phenomena like the 1994 Rwandan genocide offer us a very different view of human motivations than those who study such processes as the building and development of democratic institutions. Of course, it is difficult to say whether this divergence in the ontology of the individual is a cause of the divide between studies of order and violence or a result of it, but it is nonetheless questionable.

Given all of these disciplinary divides and methodological and metaphysical proclivities, it is little wonder that students of order, conflict,

[2] See, for instance, De Figueiredo and Weingast (1999).

and violence so rarely speak to each other. This volume is offered as a corrective to this scholarly fragmentation. At first glance, the contributions – which tackle the phenomena of order, conflict, and violence from a set of highly diverse substantive, theoretical, and methodological perspectives – might seem to be impossibly diverse, more a symptom of the fissures we describe than a treatment for them. They raise a dizzying array of questions: How does order emerge and how is it sustained? How are international norms governing violence developed and implemented? How is peaceful interaction maintained and enforced within state borders and among states, and when does it break down? What are the sources of violence? Are they primarily material – found, for example, in perpetrators' economic circumstances and in the institutional structures under which they operate – or can ideologies and other nonmaterial factors spawn violence? Are some types of social cleavages – such as class, ethnicity, or religion – more likely than others to erupt in bloodshed? And what determines the forms that such bloodshed will take – from coups, to massacres, to revolutions, to riots, to war, to genocide? How does (and *should*) legitimacy come to be conferred on some uses of violence and not on others? And most importantly, how is conflict tamed and violence averted? These essays could not be more varied – and in this respect, they reflect the state of the current division of labor. But by bringing them into dialogue here, it becomes apparent that all of the questions they raise are in fact facets of a single enduring and fundamental meta-question: how order emerges, is sustained, challenged, destroyed, transformed, and recreated.

The contributions to this volume can be ordered along four axes.

- The first, and most important, axis distinguishes between processes that lead to the creation and sustenance of order (such as Robert H. Bates' examination of how self-interested political leaders choose to cultivate the populations they control instead of expropriating from them) and those that involve the challenging, transformation, and destruction of order (such as Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín's study of the motivations of rural insurgents).
- The second axis differentiates between studies which take place at the domestic level (such as Carles Boix's exploration of class and political violence within states), at the international level (such as Karma Nabulsi's study of the development of legal norms governing conduct in war), or at the intersection of the two, where domestic dynamics are influenced and shaped by external actors (such as Michael Hechter and Nika Kabiri's study of colonial powers' attempts to impose order in Iraq).

- The third axis describes variation in the units of analysis – some contributions focus on highly aggregated units (such as Jack L. Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri's exploration of the conditions for normative change in the international system), while others address the behaviors and motivations of individuals (such as Elisabeth Jean Wood's investigation of the factors motivating the use of sexual violence), while still others operate at an intermediate level (such as Robert J. Sampson and Per-Olof H. Wikström's study of social order in the neighborhoods of Chicago and Stockholm and Stathis N. Kalyvas' assessment of the "microdynamics of civil war" research program).
- Finally, along the fourth axis we have studies that emphasize the role of material factors (such as the contributions by Boix and Bates), as well as those that emphasize the role of norms, ideas, and culture (such as Lars-Erik Cederman's exploration of the role of nationalist identities in fomenting challenges to order).

This book is divided into two parts, following the first axis described above. The essays in Part 1 consider the foundations of political order: how it emerges, how it is maintained, and how it is restored in the wake of disorder. The essays in Part 2 consider the ways in which violence and conflict serve to challenge political order, transform it, and destroy it altogether.

Part 1: Creating, maintaining, and restoring order

The question of how order is established at the national level is taken up in chapter 2 by Robert H. Bates. Drawing on Mancur Olson's (1993) equation of politics with banditry, Bates attempts to discover the conditions under which those who control a given territory – whom he calls "specialists in violence" – choose to defend rather than prey upon its inhabitants. Reasoning deductively with the aid of a game-theoretic model, Bates argues that political leaders will be more likely to uphold the state when they can derive sufficient wealth through taxation, when they are secure enough in their power that they can focus on long-term growth rather than short-term expropriation, and when there is no easy source of ready cash, such as oil or mineral wealth, outside of taxation. Bates argues that the rash of state failures that plagued the African continent in the late 1980s – characterized by the formation of private militias, signaling the state's loss of its monopoly over violence – was the result of the absence of these three conditions. The global economic recessions of the 1970s eroded Africa's nascent industrial base, immiserating its population; the "Third Wave" of democratic diffusion

introduced a measure of political uncertainty among Africa's military and single-party rulers; and the continent's considerable natural resources meant that political leaders were more likely to fight for control of those resources than cultivate a stable tax base. The confluence of these factors allowed leaders to "behave in ways that increase insecurity," resulting in the flourishing of popular militias and a breakdown of the centralized control over the tools of violence.

While Bates considers how national-level attributes figure in the calculations of domestic political elites in choosing whether to uphold or upend order, Michael Hechter and Nika Kabiri in chapter 3 consider the peculiar challenges faced by external powers in imposing order in the territories they occupy. They take up the case of the United States' presence in Iraq, and ask whether the goal of stability in that fractious land is best served by constructing a strong, centralized state apparatus – resurrecting in an admittedly more benign form of the kind of Hobbesian Leviathan once imposed by Saddam Hussein – or by ruling indirectly through local satraps. The authors point out that direct rule, though the most reliable means of quelling civil strife, is enormously costly. It requires the state to expand both the scope of its activities – that is, the range of services it provides – and the penetration of its control and policing apparatus. It also runs the risk of giving rise to counter-movements among minorities who demand control of their own governance. Indirect rule is less costly, in that it delegates some of the functions of the state to local tribal and religious leaders, thus muting demands for independence, but it requires a delicate balancing act. The ruling power must be careful to ensure that it does not systematically advantage or disadvantage any single social group, and that all depend on the central authority for some essential largesse, lest local autonomy breed noncompliance. The authors illustrate how both the Ottoman and British empires learned these lessons during their administrations of Iraq in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Of course, external powers who seek to impose order on fractious territories are not limited to the binary choice of direct or indirect rule. They can also choose to solve the problem of social disorder by cleaving the lands under their control along ethnic or religious lines. In chapter 4, Lucy Chester examines in great historical detail Britain's decisions to divide India in 1945, and its decision not to do so in Palestine during the same period. In each case, she argues, the governing consideration was not what would best achieve order, but what would best serve Britain's long-term interests. In India, partition was adopted because it offered the quickest way for Britain to extricate itself from its colonial

entanglements with its dignity reasonably intact. In Palestine, Britain abandoned its early support of partition – expressed in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 offering Palestine as a national home for the Jews – because it feared harming its relations with newly oil-rich Arab states, leaving the matter to the international community. But unlike the decision of whether to enforce direct or indirect rule, which is faced by powers who seek to establish control over a certain territory, the question of whether to impose partition seems to be asked only by powers that have given up trying to control the territories they occupy. For great powers trying to extract themselves from messy situations, order is at best a secondary consideration.

Partition, then, is tantamount to a declaration that order is impossible. In fact, Chester notes that the factors that necessitate partition – ethnic and religious heterogeneity, armed populations, and weak central control – are precisely those that are likely to render it inimical to order. This is illustrated most tragically in the case of the subcontinent's partition, where the waning power of the British empire, coupled with the not-yet-established power of the Indian and Pakistani governments, meant that there was nothing to stop the most ethnically diverse regions of the newly formed states from collapsing into communal violence and ethnic cleansing. The legacy of partition described by Chester appears to render Hechter and Kabiri's prescriptions for indirect rule in Iraq all the more urgent, and emphasizes the high stakes and difficult choices faced by the United States in its attempt to bring stability to that country.

In chapter 5, Robert J. Sampson and Per-Olof H. Wikström turn our attention from the national-level determinants of order to those operating at the level of the city neighborhood. According to the authors, studies of crime and interpersonal violence have tended to focus on the economic and psychological attributes of the perpetrators, ignoring the structural contexts in which they exist, while those that do focus on communities instead of individuals often end up merely identifying "risk factors" for violence, without describing exactly how those risk factors translate into violence. For example, social scientists have long ascribed high rates of interpersonal violence to structural conditions such as poverty, low rates of homeownership, and a lack of economic opportunity. But how these things lead to violence is largely unknown. In an innovative comparison of neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois and Stockholm, Sweden, Sampson and Wikström attempt to uncover the causal mechanism by which such disadvantage leads to violence. Using survey data collected in both cities, they argue that structural factors like poverty and transience militate against the development of social trust and what they call "collective efficacy," which can be thought of as a

willingness to intervene in the neighborhood to prevent violence and antisocial behavior. The absence of collective efficacy, they argue, is the proximate cause of violence in blighted neighborhoods and inner cities.

Sampson and Wikström's careful micro-study of social order on the streets of Chicago and Stockholm, and their elaboration of the role played by ideas and norms in militating against violence, contain important lessons for order at higher levels of aggregation. For example, Bates' analysis of poverty as a factor promoting civil instability is enriched by considering that poor populations not only render political leaders more extractive and more willing to risk instability, but are themselves likely to exhibit a diminished sense of "national" collective efficacy, thus increasing the likelihood that social groups will turn to violence against each other. Likewise, Hechter and Kabiri note that attempts at direct rule necessarily involve the imposition of a "common culture that provides the shared concepts, values and norms … required for cooperation to emerge and persist." But the success of such an endeavor may depend on pre-existing levels of social trust and community cohesion.

Karma Nabulsi in chapter 6 also attends to the role of norms and ideas in producing order, but moves us from the level of the neighborhood to the international system, offering us a critical account of the historical development of legal norms governing the conduct of states in war. Nabulsi argues that the current legal tradition, inaugurated by Hugo Grotius in the seventeenth century, was designed to serve the interests of states at the expense of those who would resist them. It did this, she argues, in two ways. First, by focusing on conduct in war instead of the justness of war itself, the tradition rendered itself mute on the question of whether any military action (for example, an invasion or an occupation) could be called unjust, essentially conferring legitimacy on whatever states do in this regard. Second, by defining war as the province of states and their armies, the tradition leaves unprotected, and in fact deems as criminals, ordinary citizens who take up arms against occupying powers. Thus, Nabulsi argues, the Grotian legal tradition, ostensibly conceived of as an effort to lessen the horrors of war by imposing standards of conduct upon states and their armies, serves only to arbitrarily legitimate some forms of violence (namely, whatever is deployed by states) while delegitimating others.

In chapter 7, Courtney Jung, Ellen Lust-Okar, and Ian Shapiro address the question of how order is created out of the disorder that often plagues ethnically and religiously divided societies. By comparing the negotiated transition from apartheid to majority rule in South Africa with less successful negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis and between Unionists and Republicans in Northern Ireland, the authors

attempt to identify the conditions necessary for the cessation of conflicts and the establishment of democracy. They find that the likelihood of success depends on whether the negotiators are able to consistently claim and cultivate public support for a settlement, thus isolating hard-liners who oppose the negotiations. For example, in 1992 de Klerk neutralized increasingly vicious attacks from rejectionists within his party by holding a "snap referendum" on power-sharing that was approved by a healthy majority throughout the country, thus giving him the political space and clout to continue on the road to transition. But seizing the commanding heights of democratic legitimacy is not a simple matter, and the authors point out it depends in part on the strategic acumen of the players, particularly on their ability to recognize and take advantage of opportunities when they present themselves. For example, the authors suggest that Israeli leader Shimon Peres in 1996 failed to seize the pro-settlement momentum that prevailed in Israel after Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assassination, choosing instead to tack to the right in order to mute attacks from the right-wing Likud Party. According to the authors, if he had held a referendum on the peace process instead of caving to the right, he might have secured a measure of democratic legitimacy that would have allowed him to make progress toward a settlement.

Additionally, Jung, Lust-Okar, and Shapiro demonstrate the complex role of violence in the emergence of order. Violence can sometimes unravel negotiations and send the parties plunging back into chaos, but at other times can serve to stiffen the negotiators' resolve to reach a solution by dramatically illustrating the costs of failure. For example, the authors tell us that the 1992 Bisho massacre in South Africa "made graphic the possibility that escalating violence could spiral out of control, forcing both sides to look into the abyss and resume (secret) negotiations." Though the chapters in this volume have so far tended to equate violence with a lack of order, the authors of this chapter illustrate powerfully that order itself can be born of violence.

Part 2: Challenging, transforming, and destroying order

Some orders are more durable than others, and all come under attacks that can result in their reconfiguration and collapse. The chapters in this half of the volume explore the dynamics of such challenges to order. They investigate the motivations of the challengers, the conditions that make challenges more likely, and the ways in which they can succeed in transforming order. Mirroring Bates' rationalist examination of the conditions under which "specialists in violence" will choose to uphold order, Carles Boix in chapter 8 addresses the "material and organizational conditions

under which political actors choose violence as a feasible strategy to shape political outcomes." Boix notes that most current studies of political violence focus either on the presence or absence of opportunities for violence, or on the motives of potential insurgents. Boix aims to offer a unified theory of political violence that gives equal attention to both motive and opportunity.

According to Boix, political actors will engage in violence if they calculate that they have more to gain from trying to overthrow the existing order than from accepting it. The calculation involves two variables: the costs of violence, and the gains from changing the political order compared to the gains from remaining under the status quo. The costs of violence are determined by the kinds of logistical factors discussed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) – such as whether the insurgents have access to remote and hard-to-reach areas from which to stage their attacks, and whether the state has adequate reach. The gains from violence are determined by two factors: the distribution pattern, and relative mobility, of assets in society. If assets are distributed in a vastly unequal manner, potential insurgents have more to gain from violence, since expropriation of the rich will yield a handsome prize. However, if those assets are mobile, then the rich can ferret them out of the country in anticipation of attack, leaving insurgents with nothing. Thus, Boix predicts that violence becomes more likely when assets are immobile.

Boix's framework recognizes the fact that order and violence are but two sides of the same coin. Though he frames his inquiry in terms of the factors that render political groups more likely to engage in violence, he also demonstrates how these same factors contribute to the development of particular political institutions. For example, he tells us that democracy is likely to result when the distribution of assets is not too unequal (such that the poor do not have an incentive to impose confiscatory taxes on the rich), and assets are mobile enough that the taxed have a credible means of escape, thus disciplining the majority's revenue demands.

In chapter 9, Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín takes issue with the notion, which pervades Boix's contribution, that insurgents are motivated solely by mercenary concerns, that their decisions can be reduced to economic calculations. He asks, whether "the political dimensions of armed conflict [can] be reduced to a pretext for individual enrichment." Drawing on examples from the ongoing insurgency in Colombia, he points out that the requisites of economic and political success are often at odds with each other: the single-minded pursuit of economic objectives can lead to the collapse of an insurgency; while politics can "get in the way" of business. Insurgents who pursue their greed often end up evaporating their fund of public support through overtaxation. Additionally, those

who are interested solely in rent collection will have short time horizons, rendering them unable to engage in the kind of strategic calculation necessary for political success. Gutiérrez Sanín offers the example of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, who lost a great deal of grass-roots support and did violence to their strategic alliances with local elites, in areas when they engaged in predatory taxation. Finally, Gutiérrez Sanín points out that groups that are motivated strictly by economics would never choose to engage in political activities to begin with, since aggressive politicization is too costly for purely economically motivated actors, as it brings the attention of the state – something that criminals studiously avoid. Despite this, Gutiérrez Sanín notes, "the amount and intensity of *direct* criminal participation in politics in the past twenty years is rather amazing," although it is almost always "bad for business." Clearly, then, the motives of insurgency leaders cannot be said to be merely economic.

But what of the rank and file who join such insurgencies? Many existing models that attempt to account for why individuals would join insurgent groups point to the fact that these groups offer members material "selective incentives" as enticements to join (Olson 1965). But, Gutiérrez Sanín notes, such incentives can actually corrode organizational structures. He tells us that Colombian paramilitaries that paid their fighters by giving them control of a small portion of narcotics operations found their organizations torn asunder by internal struggles for control of these rents. Military readiness suffered as well, since officers and troops began to neglect the business of fighting the enemy in order to tend to their own narrow little criminal enterprises. The upshot is that organizations that recruit using greed as their major selling point are unlikely to be successful.

But if political insurgents are not simply mercenary in their aspirations, what are they? Lars-Erik Cederman in chapter 10 attempts to answer this question. Like Boix, he argues that studies of political violence and civil war tend to focus exclusively either on motives or on opportunities. But, like Gutiérrez Sanín, he faults those studies that pay attention to motive for their narrow emphasis on pecuniary incentives. Instead, Cederman offers an alternate account of political insurgency that unifies both motive and opportunity, and retains a place for material and nonmaterial factors. He argues that structural factors – such as geography and state strength – are essential ingredients in the formation of political insurgency, but that these are mediated through cultural and ideational factors. The inhabitants of peripheral areas are more likely to rebel not simply because they exist in areas where the state's control apparatus is weak, but because they are likely to have developed a national identity and sense of self that is

markedly different from that which prevails at the center. Using computer simulations, Cederman demonstrates the plausibility of an account of civil wars that begins with material factors, but which are "primarily mediated through geo-cultural mechanisms."

In chapter 11, Steven I. Wilkinson picks up Cederman's focus on the role of identities in producing challenges to the prevailing order. Noting that religious identities are currently thought to be inherently more violence prone than those of class, region, or language, Wilkinson asks where we can make such a claim about any identity. After all, he points out, in the nineteenth century, scholars like John Stuart Mill thought that linguistic identities were the source of intractable conflict, while in the twentieth century, scholars such as Laitin (1999) declare the opposite. Using an original dataset on civil conflict in India, Wilkinson finds that religion is positively correlated with violence, but argues that this is not because religion is fundamentally more bloody than other forms of identity. Instead, he attributes increased rates of Hindu–Muslim violence to the policies of the Indian state, which involve the use of force to quell political mobilization by religious minorities, while tolerating mobilization by the Hindu majority and by regional and linguistic groups. The roots of this policy, Wilkinson argues, can be found in India's struggle for independence, which rendered its leaders hostile to political claims made by Muslims, which they equate with the separatism that led to partition and the formation of Pakistan. Hindu–Muslim violence, then, is in part a function of the Indian state's notions of what order requires.

Wilkinson's contribution is an important antidote to studies of identity-based conflicts which see them as immutable functions of the identities themselves. Nowhere are such views more prevalent than with regard to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which is often described as the outcome of longstanding inter-ethnic hatred. In chapter 12, Scott Straus examines the microdynamics of the killing in Rwanda and offers further evidence that ethnic differences are in and of themselves insufficient for explaining the collapse of order in ethnically divided societies. According to Straus, not all of Rwanda took to the killing with equal alacrity. And some areas – indistinguishable from the rest of the country ethnically, economically, and socially – managed to escape the violence altogether. According to Straus, the main determinant of violence was the political security of the local leader. Leaders participated in the slaughter of Tutsis when not doing so meant that they could lose their power. According to Straus, the "killing became a basis for authority" in Rwanda, and those who did not participate risked being supplanted by internal challengers more willing to engage in the slaughter. And though we typically view the Rwandan genocide as an instance of the collapse of

order, Straus' study emphasizes that the genocide was above all an attempt to erect a new order. Indeed, many of Straus' informants argued that the massacre of Tutsis had become the new "law," suggesting that violence *was* the new order.

We have seen throughout this volume how violence can both create and destroy order, but is there any order in violence? It is difficult to conclude from accounts of mass killings and rapes that there is anything systematic to be said about the tools and technologies of slaughter, but this is precisely what Elisabeth Jean Wood sets out to do in chapter 13. Wood attempts to explore use of sexual violence – which includes rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriages – during conflict. She concludes that existing accounts of sexual violence – which emphasize such things as the promotion of masculine aggression in soldiers and the desire to demoralize the enemy by violating its women – are insufficient to explain regional and temporal variation in the employment of sexual aggression in wartime. Instead, Wood argues that to properly understand the logic of sexual violence in war, we must attend to the "regulatory mechanisms" that govern the "expression of sexual aggression" in peacetime. She urges us to develop an understanding of how these mechanisms work, the peacetime levels of sexual violence they promote, why some of them break down while others persist, and how they are transformed in wartime. She suggests that sexual violence is likely to be restricted during conflict if peacetime norms governing sexual aggression are deeply held by leaders and members, and if the organization depends on civilians for support and resources.

Wood's call to focus on the regulatory mechanisms that govern violence is answered by Isabel V. Hull in chapter 14. Like Nabulsi, Hull focuses on the development of legal norms governing conduct in war during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and on the ways in which the prerogatives of the powerful end up shaping the norms to render abuses against civilians more likely. Specifically, Hull argues that Imperial Germany's success in obtaining exceptions to international laws of war for cases of "military necessity" meant that Germany's actions during the First World War were restricted only by what its military leaders thought they needed to do to achieve victory. This would not have been alarming if "military necessity" simply implied a "justification for extraordinary actions" in times of war. But in the minds of German strategists, military necessity was actually "a set of basic assumptions about the nature of war" itself. Moderation in war, according to German military thought, was impossible, because all war was total war, necessitating the use of as awesome a destructive force as Germany could muster, against soldiers and civilians alike. Hull

describes how, during the First World War, atrocities such as the planned deportation of Belgians to work in German arms factories became the norm (and later figured in the punitive sanctions imposed on Germany after the war). Germany's civilian leaders were helpless to stop the ever widening spiral of uncontrolled bloodshed – they could not question the military's actions, lest they be seen as jeopardizing victory. In the end, argues Hull, "Military necessity, the doctrine which Imperial German military culture had developed to free the army from the fetters of international law, had become Germany's straitjacket." A flawed order contained within itself the seeds of violence.

International order is also the subject of the contribution by Jack L. Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri in chapter 15. The authors consider the challenges faced by the diverse sets of actors – from states to NGOs – that seek to bring about normative change in the international community – such as the promotion of democracy or the establishment of global legal institutions like the International Criminal Court. Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that "those who seek to transform the culture of contemporary anarchy need to work within an existing material and institutional setting that may enable, derail, or pervert efforts to promote change." In the case of Iraq, for example, efforts to introduce democracy have foundered because of the lack of a "strong reform coalition and useable institutions for the rule of law." Above all, the authors counsel realism and moderation. "Efforts to force the pace of change," they write, "risk unintended consequences that could wind up hindering change and increasing its costs." For example, they point out that a legalistic and uncompromising approach to the implementation of new norms can wreak havoc on the ground. They offer the example of how the zealousness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in 2001 in investigating war crimes by Albanian guerrillas in Macedonia scuttled a political settlement between the rebels and the Macedonian government, giving hard-line Slavs a pretext to renew the bloodshed. The imposition of international order can destroy a hard-earned domestic one.

The contribution by Stathis N. Kalyvas in chapter 16 offers a methodological assessment of the study of the dynamics of conflict and violence at the subnational level. By focusing on a slew of recent research on Nepal, he aims to highlight the pitfalls of what is otherwise an extremely promising research program, one that can be described as the "microdynamics of civil wars." This research program has emerged as a way out of the current impasse generated by the wave of cross-national econometric research – where it is typically extremely difficult to tell which variables really matter and exactly how they do. He stresses the importance of understanding and measuring territorial control; he

argues that violence is a tricky indicator, as its absence in the context of an ongoing civil war (or the presence of order) can signal either an absence of conflict or the presence of intense conflict; he identifies two key problems, the overaggregation and the omission of key variables, and demonstrates their potential for bias. As a result, he calls for a deeper engagement with cases, careful and detailed collection of fine-grained data, and thorough theorization.

Kalyvas' chapter provides a fitting conclusion to this volume. By pointing to the perverse and unexpected ways in which order and violence are related, he reinforces the insight that both phenomena must be understood with reference to each other. In fact, this is a point that is driven home by all of the essays in this volume. Though they range widely over such diverse disciplines as political science, economics, history, sociology, philosophy, and law; employ different methodologies, from game theory to statistical modeling to in-depth historical narrative to anthropological ethnography; and focus on vastly different units of analysis and levels of aggregation, from the state to the individual to the world system; all of them demonstrate how order and violence are inextricably intertwined. As we have seen, those who study violence implicitly attend to the ways in which order is transformed. Those who study the establishment of order must necessarily attend to the ways in which violence and those with the capacity to use it are tamed. And though we conceived of the contributions to this volume addressing fundamental questions of *order*: how it is established, maintained, and destroyed; we could have just as easily conceived of it as an inquiry into the nature of *violence*: how it arises, how it is quelled, and how it is used. In a very real sense, we are all students of violence, and we are all students of order. Our hope will be that this volume will demonstrate the benefits to be garnered by integrating the study of these two facets of human society.

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