compared to the very small number of cases. Income data from the Luxembourg Income Study, the study’s primary data source, are applicable for only 15 national cases. To overcome this problem, Kenworthy differentiates most variables (e.g., change in employment or income is compared to change in inequality), and he also employs the neat device of running repeated regressions that use all the possible three-variable combinations of independent variables to explain a given dependent variable. This analytical device is indicative of a broader methodological standard that he applies to the evidence. Indeed, one of Kenworthy’s major achievements with this book is that he is not blinded by the data. Sure, he expects statistical significance across his repeated regressions, but then he also demands that his findings conform to theoretical predictions and be consistent to a historically and contextually sensitive narrative. As a result, his findings are presented in an accessible and nuanced way, making this a wonderful model for students writing dissertations.

That said, I was less convinced by some of the arguments in the policy-oriented concluding Chapter 8. Kenworthy’s policy prescriptions boil down to the need for more employment-friendly policies and special attention to equal opportunity in job access. There is much in his list of policy prescriptions to agree with, such as well-targeted active labor market interventions and other supports designed to address the increasing instability of work, as well as improved public child care, schooling, and health care. While all these policies will reduce the cost of employing, somewhat more problematic is the author’s proposal for directly reducing wages to spur employment growth in some contexts. This necessarily implies greater individual earnings inequality, which, he argues, can be solved by earnings subsidies or employment-conditional negative taxes, such as the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit. But at what point does this pro-employment approach toward reducing inequality reach its limits?

First, lowering the cost of employing through transfer policies could have perverse productivity effects at the micro- or firm level by reducing the incentives to train, innovate, and improve workplace relations, thus lowering economic growth in the long run. Second, relying on the welfare state to fill the egalitarian gap resulting from lower wages arguably leaves something of a political deficit. While this problem is shared by all top-down welfare programs, the “low wages and welfare” strategy may be particularly undesirable if it disarms the very constituency for the package of tax policies, active labor market policies, and other measures that the strategy assumes. Third, it is by no means clear whether, and in what sense, this political choice even exists in most contexts. Although Kenworthy does note the effects of deeply ingrained institutions in some countries, such as “pattern” or corporatist wage setting, he rather too quickly dismisses the ideas of institutional complementarity and coherence. There is no reason to think that what might be tried somewhere in the American federal experiment will fit easily elsewhere. Not that there is anything wrong with trying, and this is Kenworthy’s vital contribution.


— Stathis N. Kalyvas, Yale University

Rarely does a cover convey with such accuracy a book’s central argument as in John Mueller’s The Remnants of War. Shot by Ron Haviv, maybe the most iconic photographer of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the cover picture shows a Serb soldier celebrating the fall of the town of Vukovar. The middle-aged soldier is drunk as he downs a bottle of liquor with the town’s ruins in the background. In fact, he looks more like a homeless man in any European or American city than anything we would associate with the modern military profession—an observation that summarizes Mueller’s four-tiered argument.

First, Mueller argues, the world is experiencing a secular decline of major interstate war. While this decline has a structural and institutional underpinning (namely, the dramatic rise of state capacity, domestically and internationally), it is driven primarily by “idea entrepreneurs” who have managed to produce a massive and deep change in popular values, comparable to the decline in popularity of dueling and slavery. Second, modern civil wars are mostly fought by predatory violence entrepreneurs and armies consisting of little more than packs of criminals and bullies seeking to exploit state weakness in the poor periphery of the developed world. Third, because these warlords are undisciplined cowards, they can be easily defeated by modern professional armies; however, military interventions are unlikely because of the domestic politics of advanced industrial democracies. Last, there may be hope for an internal, as opposed to an external, solution to this problem of “residual war.” As governments of poor countries become more effective, they may be able to crack down on criminal warlords more effectively than they have been until now.

This is a sweeping, multifaceted, and complex argument that speaks to multiple research programs in political science, generates several policy recommendations, and addresses central issues of our time. I found the parts on the decline of major war, in particular, to be absolutely fascinating, and the effort to conceptualize violent conflict on a continuum going from small crime to terrorism to be very stimulating. In short, this is a nice example of a rich and erudite book that speaks to a larger public without sacrificing scholarly thoroughness.
A book review of this size can do little justice to such a multifaceted argument, hence my focus on one dimension of the argument, the character of modern civil wars: This is the part most central to the overall argument and certainly the newest component of an intellectual project that Mueller has honed over a number of years and publications.

The argument about the essentially criminal aspect of civil wars echoes the well-known theories of “new wars” and dovetails with the equally known claim about “greed” as a causal factor behind civil war. The main difference between Mueller and the proponents of these arguments lies in interpretation. What is new for the proponents of the “new war” and “greed” theses is just residual for Mueller, the kind of violent conflict that becomes visible after major forms of war have disappeared: Contemporary civil wars are “essentially ancient forms of criminal war in which criminals and thugs . . . engage in warfare in much the same way they did in medieval and early modern Europe” (p. 86).

Mueller makes a bold case for his argument, culling anecdotes from several sources and introducing nuance when there is a need for it. For example, he recognizes that the distinction between disciplined and criminal warfare is ideal-typical and often fuzzy. He also distinguishes between three types of civil warfare: “mercenary” warfare fought by recently empowered and unpolicied thugs, rather than ordinary citizens; “brigand” warfare related to state failure; and disciplined civil warfare, which does not display the kind of pathology evidenced in the former two types. Typical examples include the wars of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (mercenary warfare), Liberia and Colombia (brigand warfare), and Sri Lanka (disciplined warfare). As these examples make clear, this is a hard distinction to measure and sustain. The Rwandan case, in particular, is the toughest one to fit into this framework.

Ultimately, Mueller forgoes the systematic exploration of the processes that produce these different types of civil warfare in the first place. Had he not, he would have been forced to examine the analytical content of this distinction in more depth. At present, this distinction hinges on rather fuzzy evidence and a commitment to a single dimension of civil war, namely, the fighters’ motivations—hence, the unabashedly military-centric character of his analysis of civil war. Political and social elites, as well as the masses, play a minor role in his account. The fact that civil wars entail the participation of small groups of individuals rather than masses is compatible with all sorts of motivations among both categories.

Looking at Haviv’s entire portfolio, rather than just the picture of the drunk soldier in the cover, one is confronted with the multidimensionality of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Consider some shots: A Serb man cries as Croatian forces capture his town; well-disciplined Yugoslav federal troops celebrate a victory; a Serb woman burns all her socialist books; Bosnian crowds demonstrate while holding Tito’s picture. Whether these dimensions are essential or incidental to the war’s causality remains an open question, to be investigated both theoretically and empirically. Mueller should be commended for having written an ambitious book that poses these fundamental questions with clarity and boldness.

Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization.

— Robert Hunter Wade, London School of Economics

Martin Wolf, the influential economic correspondent of Financial Times, concludes his book Why Globalization Works (2004): “What the successful countries all share is a move towards the market economy, one in which private property rights, free enterprise and competition increasingly took the place of state ownership, planning and protection. They chose, however haltingly, the path of economic liberalization and international integration. This is the heart of the matter. All else is commentary” (pp. 143–44).

Wolf echoes the orthodoxy of our age, though he presents it as an embattled minority view in danger of being swamped by “the enemies mustering both outside and inside the gates” (p. 4), also known as the “anti-globalists.” The large majority of professional and academic economists working in North America and Europe would broadly agree with him, as would a majority in the international relations subdiscipline of international political economy (IPE). The difference between them and Wolf is readability. Wolf writes in plain English. The academics use the methodology of formalization to polish the surface until icily dull, and practice an almost rancorous rejection of interpretive theory, springy narrative, or adventitious insight.