

cess. The literature on democratization and on civil-military relations pays little attention to the democratization of communist military. Ulrich shows that Samuel Huntington's thesis (*The Soldier and the State*, 1957) needs to be modified in that military professionalism and civilian control differ significantly between communist and democratic militaries.

Ulrich highlights well the deficiencies of traditional approaches (such as those of Huntington) that assume the military can stand aside from and be unaffected by great societal changes. She shows the critical differences between civil-military relations in democratic and communist systems as well as the importance of democratic political control and democratizing postcommunist states. In a very good table (pp. 24–5) Ulrich shows the marked differences between military professionalism in a democratic and communist state in such areas as recruitment and attention, promotion and advancement, officership and leadership, education and training, norms of political influence, prestige and public relations, and compatibility of military and societal values. Thus, democratic political control and democratic military professionalism are critical to democratic militaries that can overcome the legacies of the past.

Yet, there are difficulties with this volume. The first, and a major one from the viewpoint of comparative historical analysis, is whether the fundamental comparison of Russian and Czech cases makes sense. Both countries are on the periphery of Western Europe and underwent democratic overthrow of the communist regime, but Russia has been a great and vast power, even a superpower, whereas the Czech Republic (itself only a recent creation) has been for the most part either a smallish part of a larger empire (Hapsburg) or a relatively dependent smaller state in Central Europe. Russia made history, whereas the Czechs had history made on them. Culturally, the Czechs were an integral part of European culture, and the Russians were peripheral outsiders. Ideologically, the Russians embraced communism in the October Revolution, but the revolution in Czechoslovakia, although much more popular than elsewhere, still in 1948 relied on Russian power. On the eve of communism, Czechoslovakia in 1948 was historically one of the more advanced industrial powers in Europe (renowned for its Skoda works), whereas Russia in 1913 was an industrial laggard with high rates of illiteracy and semiliteracy.

Furthermore, there is an exaggerated emphasis on the power of exogenous factors—especially American power and influence—to transform the nature of militaries, communist or not. Ulrich argues that “the United States’ inability to overcome its own Cold War legacy as evidenced in the persistence of Cold War bureaucratic inertia accounts for much of the lack of success” of Russian and Czech military reform. She is even more explicit in laying the blame on American policy by adding: “The United States was unable to release adequate resources from its defense arsenal . . . to fund and staff sufficiently efforts to help post-Communist militaries make the ideological and organizational shifts necessary to consolidate democracy in the region” (pp. 180–1). But, by her own later statements (p. 184), “the prevalence of democratic values and expectations as evidenced in the oversight capabilities of the developing democratic institutions, the media and the society at large determined the extent of democratic political control of the armed forces.”

The United States has some influence, but institutional change, unless directed by an occupying power (as in postwar Germany and Japan, but not in the post-Cold War cases), must largely come from within a society and an institution, especially a total institution such as the Russian military. The

Soviet military was a powerful and successful institution proud of its great victories in World War II and its role in elevating the Soviet Union to global parity with the United States, space exploits, and superpower status. Democracy, as the author does mention at one point, is seen as destroying the power status, glory, and budgets of the military, whereas Marxism-Leninism brought it military glory, high budgets, and great status. Thus, even much greater American funding would have had little effect and perhaps even, coming from the triumphant enemy, a negative role in changing the Russian military.

Ulrich argues at the beginning that “the military institutions of the former Soviet bloc must overcome patterns of interaction between civilian authorities and military leaders that contrasted sharply with the norms of interaction that their Western democratic counterparts experienced” (p. 1). The problem is whether there is only one possible model for modern countries, that of the United States, or whether countries with very different levels of economic and political development and different cultures, geography, and histories can evolve in a somewhat different direction. If Japan can develop models for democracy (dominant one-party system) and capitalism (strong government role and *zaibatsu* driven), why cannot Russia create its own models that incorporate some Western notions and others compatible with deep Russian traditions and history?

Furthermore, has enough time elapsed to make a serious judgment about the two militaries? Although political scientists do not adhere to historians’ 30-year rule, Ulrich is making judgments based on less than seven years’ experience in postcommunist Russia (and even more a pre-Putin Russia) and merely ten years for the postcommunist Czech Republic (only five years in its post-Slovakia phase). At a similar point after the American Revolution, the United States (1788) still had not consolidated and was wrapping up the Articles of Confederation. Seven years after the French Revolution (1796) Napoleon had not yet appeared on the scene, and seven years after the English Revolution (1656) Oliver Cromwell was still lord protector and the restoration of Charles II was four years away. It may be too soon—and the material too fresh—to understand fully what from the viewpoint of a decade or two may be much clearer.

We do walk away with a heightened appreciation of the difficulties of the transition regimes, of the resistant power of institutions to change even in the face of failure and disaster, and especially the parlous state of the Russian military. Corruption, low morale, terrible living conditions, public disapproval, and poor battlefield competence hinder the largely untransformed army at every turn. Overall, then, this is a valuable book in achieving its goals, but other issues need to be addressed.

Confessions of an Interest Group: The Catholic Church and Political Parties in Europe. By Carolyn M. Warner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 249p. \$55.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

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The empirical puzzle at the heart of this book is the diverging postwar behavior of the Catholic Church in France and Italy (1944–58). Why did the French church, which needed far more political help to recover lost ground after World War II, link only superficially with a political party before abandoning it altogether, whereas the Italian church, which exited

the war in much better shape, forged much stronger connections with a party? Phrased more generally, why and how do churches pick their political allies?

To address this question and the more general issue of the links between interest groups and parties, Carolyn Warner adopts a two-pronged strategy. First, she offers an “economic metaphor” (p. 5) that draws on the microeconomic theory of the firm: The Catholic Church is seen as an interest group whose actions can be “modeled” as if it were a firm in a market seeking a supplier of goods. The question is then restated in economic terms. Second, there is an extensive and nuanced historical narrative of the two cases, together with a short excursus in Germany, along the following lines. Although both churches supported Christian Democratic parties (the Christian Democratic Party [DC] in Italy and the Popular Republican Movement [MRP] in France), the French church did so much less vigorously than the Italian one, due to a complex combination of factors that included past legacies and divergent structures and preferences (such as traditions of anticlericalism, more or less centralized church structures, and leadership preferences). Eventually, the French church abandoned the MRP altogether when it failed to promote the church’s policy agenda. In short, “the key difference was that the Christian Democratic Party did not fail the Church on the Church’s core policy concerns; the Popular Republican Movement did” (p. 118). But why did the MRP do so? Warner argues that its ideological concerns did not match those of the church. The loss of church support led to the demise of the MRP.

If Warner’s account is correct, the empirical puzzle that motivates the book is not much of a puzzle. If the MRP defaulted on its side of the deal, why is it surprising that the church abandoned it? More generally, if the French church was multifariously plagued by its past (and one encounters variations of this argument in many historical accounts), what is surprising about its failure to establish a strong political bridgehead? In fact, the real puzzles turn out to be the demise of the MRP (as compared to the success of the DC) and its decision to forgo the support of the church, which led to its own demise, both of which Warner addresses.

Both the MRP and the DC have been the objects of numerous historical studies, and the failure of the MRP in particular has motivated a number of them. Warner offers by far the most thorough and ambitious comparative treatment of these two parties during the crucial 1944–58 period. Nevertheless, the book has a number of problems. First, it is not entirely convincing that church support is the only variable that explains the MRP’s failure. Indeed, the divergent trajectory in the two countries is heavily overdetermined. For example, the reason the French church was not as anticommunist as the Italian one may be found in the variation of the threat posed by the Communist Party in each country; the war experiences of the two churches; their prewar politics, which in one case go as far back as the French Revolution; or how specific organizations and leaders interpreted this past. It is not always easy (or even possible) to discriminate among all these variables, given the research design.

Second, some historical arguments, in particular those concerning the pre-1944 period, are debatable. They include, among others, church perceptions of the French Third Republic, the effect of the Dreyfus affair, and the legacy of the prewar Catholic political mobilization.

Third, the account of the withdrawal of church support from the MRP is problematic in the following way. Whereas the two Catholic churches and the DC are treated as rational actors, the MRP is (evolutionary) irrational: It defaults on its

deal with the church, effectively committing suicide. The reason, Warner argues, is that the MRP was blinded by ideology; it was an “idealistic” party (p. 184) whose view of itself undermined its office-seeking interests (p. 168). This may well be possible, although one wonders why the MRP did not behave as idealistically in the first place (i.e., in 1946). Still, treating the MRP as an exceptional type of actor raises serious doubts about the overall argument, both substantively and analytically. Moreover, explaining the MRP’s demise by pointing to its self-defeating preferences verges on the tautological.

Finally, the historical narrative is not fully consistent. It reads at times like an ideational story, in which ideology dominates, and at times like a structuralist-determinist account, in which existing structures and past legacies determine the present (e.g., pp. 140–1). In both instances, and contrary to what Warner asserts in the conclusion (p. 207), there is hardly room for any strategic interaction.

On the positive side, Warner is to be commended for her exemplary archival research in France and Italy. The material from primary sources is of a quality one rarely finds in political science. The high point of the book is chapter 7, which provides a concise yet extremely rich depiction of the mobilization techniques used by the church in the two countries that should be read by students of party politics. Contrary to much work in the rationalist tradition, Warner does not assume away the actors’ preferences but scrutinizes them carefully. She historicizes her interpretations by providing a plausible account of how past and present contexts shape actors’ understandings of the world around them as well as their own self-understandings. These are not easy tasks, and Warner generally carries them out in a competent way.

Yet, Warner’s combination of a rationalist framework and a historical narrative ultimately falls short. The analytical payoff of the economic metaphor neither generates nonobvious or counterintuitive predictions nor resonates in the historical narrative. Notwithstanding claims to the contrary, the economic metaphor is hardly used as a “tool” (p. 220), even less “a model” (p. 12). Do we really need economics to figure out that “the Churches chose the Christian Democratic parties because the parties’ programs and capacities most closely matched Church preferences” (p. 115)? The numerous qualifications of actor “rationality” due to various constraints (prior choices, leaders’ ideology, institutions and structures) further rob the rationalist framework of whatever analytical and explanatory leverage it may have; in short, it feels like an artificial structure that has been superimposed on the historical narrative.

Research that aims to stride the fine line between deductive analysis and historical narrative faces a crucial dilemma: Either its analytical framework is functional (it is primarily deductive and yields nonobvious predictions), in which case the narrative ought to be “harnessed” by it and made as transparent as possible (even at the cost of simplifications); or the narrative is better left without a confining explicit framework (either because the story is too rich and multifaceted or because the analytical framework may not be geared toward the particular class of events described or attuned to the kind of evidence produced). By disregarding this dilemma, Warner is pulled in two directions at once. She has produced a fine electoral history of political Catholicism in postwar Italy and France rather than a theoretical treatment of linkages between parties and interest groups.