Introduction

The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, I argue that the study of civil wars must incorporate a solid theoretical understanding of warfare; second, I introduce a distinction between three different types of civil war based on how they are fought and trace the origins of each type; third, I explore the effects of these types of warfare on the patterns of violence in civil wars. The purpose of the chapter is primarily conceptual and ‘theory-generating’ rather than ‘theory-testing’.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided in three sections. Section 1 discusses the necessity of incorporating a theory of warfare into the social-scientific research on civil strife. It then identifies three types of warfare that characterise civil wars. Two are well known: conventional and irregular warfare; the third one tends to be mischaracterised: I call it ‘symmetric non-conventional’ warfare. I trace the origins of each type to three distinct processes: failed military coups or secessions in federal states tend to produce civil wars fought via conventional warfare; peripheral or rural insurgencies tend to give rise to civil wars fought via irregular war; and state collapse leads to civil wars fought in a ‘symmetric’ but ‘non-conventional’ way. I argue that this distinction may move us beyond imprecise but popular typologies, of the ‘old war’ versus ‘new war’ type. Section 2 relies on a brief discussion of seven cases to illuminate the empirical links between warfare and violence; the cases were chosen to maximise the variety of warfare type and the ethnic/non-ethnic dimension: Algeria 1954–62, Angola 1961–75, Lebanon 1975–90, Liberia 1987–2003, Nigeria–Biafra 1967–70, Oman 1965–75, and Spain 1936–39, Last, in Section 3 I explore the theoretical links between warfare and violence. I identify three theoretical accounts of violence. The sociological thesis connects violence to deep prewar divisions and conflicts; the Hobbesian thesis imputes causal force to the collapse of order and anarchy; and the military thesis points to vulnerability as the causal mechanism behind mass civilian victimisation. I conclude with methodological observations about the links between these arguments and the type of warfare practised in civil wars.
Warfare in civil wars: three types

It is not an exaggeration to say that warfare has generally been absent from the social-scientific study of civil wars and revolutions. The great majority of research in the social sciences has privileged instead the study of social and political factors that are thought to affect the onset or termination of a civil wars and revolutions. In overlooking warfare, social scientists have made a mistake that mirrors another well-known error, namely the reduction of civil wars (and wars in general) to the exhaustive treatment of their military details – their tactics, techniques and firepower, while their political and social content is ignored. As a result, the study of war has been marginalised and relegated to specialised (typically descriptive) case studies, while the politics of civil wars are often treated as if they were no different from regular politics during times of peace, when people make choices much as they would do in the context of electoral politics – rather than situations deeply embedded in and shaped by armed combat.

However, as Mao Zedong observed, ‘war has its own particular characteristics and in this sense it cannot be equated with politics in general’. Indeed, the importance of warfare in structuring politics, altering the social and economic environment, shaping individual and collective incentives, and defining who the relevant political actors are, cannot be underestimated. This is particularly the case for micro-level research that seeks to uncover the mechanisms of recruitment, defection and violence. Viewed from this perspective, war is a social and political environment fundamentally different from peace in at least two crucial ways. First, it entails far more constraints and far less consent; second, the stakes are incomparably higher for the individuals involved. It is one thing to vote for a party, and another to fight (and possibly die) for it. In times of war, ‘the ambiguity that normally characterize[s] everyday common sense and practice [is] simply no longer acceptable: one [has] to choose between one of two sides’. During the American Civil War, ‘normal expectations collapsed, to be replaced by frightening and bewildering personal and cultural chaos. The normal routes by which people solved problems and channeled behavior had been destroyed. . . . Ordinary people, civilians as well as soldiers, were trapped by guerrilla war in a social landscape in which almost nothing remained recognizable or secure.’ In short, the key contribution of war is the primacy of violence as a resource, ‘the virtual equation of power and injury’. Again, as Mao Zedong put it, ‘politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed’.

The implications of overlooking warfare and subsuming it under the political conflict with which it is associated are considerable. Phenomena such as collective action, mobilisation and violence are automatically and exclusively linked to the prewar political and social dynamics that are posited to have motivated the conflict in the first place. The civilian behaviour and
collective identities that inform the war are, likewise, seen as reflections of prewar conflicts; civilian collaboration with an insurgent political actor easily becomes interpreted as an indicator of civilian preference and support for this actor; individual participation in an insurgent army may be misleadingly interpreted as a risky choice and raise the spectre of the collective action problem, when in fact non-participation may turn out to have been much riskier. Hence a focus on warfare is essential in understanding how civil wars endogenously affect (and even transform) the strategies and identities of the political actors as well as the individuals involved in the war. At the same time, the analysis of warfare makes sense only if it is ultimately integrated into a comprehensive treatment of civil war.

Any discussion of warfare and civil war must begin by stressing the essential distinction between type of war and type of warfare. Wars can be classified in many useful ways: some stress the primary actors involved (e.g. international or domestic), their goals (e.g. offensive or defensive), their worldviews and societal projects (‘greed and grievance’), and so on. In contrast, the analysis of warfare begins from the form and type of warfare used in a given war.

A common empirical observation in the descriptive literature on civil wars is that most of them are fought by means of irregular (‘guerrilla’) rather than conventional warfare. A few civil wars mix irregular and conventional warfare (e.g. Russia, China, Vietnam), while a very small number are fought fully or predominantly as conventional wars (e.g. Spain). All in all, conventional civil wars are ‘rare instances appearing only under specific and rather exceptional circumstances’. In contrast, almost all interstate wars are fought conventionally. In short, there is a high degree of overlap between civil and non-conventional war on the one hand, and interstate and conventional war, on the other. It follows that any analysis of civil war must incorporate a thorough understanding of non-conventional forms of warfare.

The distinction between irregular and conventional war is common and widely accepted, though the terminology varies. Like all distinctions, it is an ideal-typical one with the two types’ edges blending into each other; nevertheless, it remains an essential one. The existing terminological and conceptual confusion and the difficulties of operationalisation should not be taken to imply that irregular war is just a figment of some authors’ imagination.

Conventional warfare entails face-to-face confrontations between regular armies across clear frontlines. This type of warfare requires a commonly shared perception of a balance of power between the two sides. In the absence of some kind of mutual consent (which entails some reasonable belief in future victory), no conventional battle can take place. On the other hand, irregular war is a type of warfare that requires a choice by the strategically weaker side ‘to assume the tactical offensive in selected forms, times, and places’ – in other words, to refuse to match the stronger side’s expectations
in terms of the conventionally accepted basic rules of warfare. A stylised description of irregular war goes as follows: the state (or incumbent) fields regular troops and is able to control urban and accessible terrain, while seeking to militarily engage its opponents in peripheral and rugged terrain; challengers (rebels or insurgents) ‘hover just below the military horizon’, hiding and relying on harassment and surprise, ‘stealth and raid’. Such wars often turn into wars of attrition, with insurgents seeking to win by not losing while imposing unbearable costs on their opponent. As a Vietnamese communist told an American official in 1975: ‘One side is not strong enough to win and the other is not weak enough to lose’. There are many variations on this stylised scenario, involving outside intervention or assistance that may lead the insurgents to gradually switch from irregular war to conventional war (e.g. China); conversely, the progressive deterioration of the state may force incumbents to opt for irregular war as well (e.g. Liberia).

In short, irregular warfare is a manifestation of military asymmetry between actors – both in terms of their respective power and their ensuing willingness to fight on the same plane: the weaker actor refuses to directly face the stronger one. The main empirical indicator of irregular war is the dearth of large-scale direct military confrontations or ‘set battles’ and the absence of frontlines. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed or implied, irregular war is not wedded to a specific cause (revolutionary, communist or nationalist) but can deployed to serve a very diverse range of goals. Of course, asymmetry is not an exclusive feature of irregular war; it is also compatible with other forms of violence, including ‘terrorism’.

While asymmetry is predominantly expressed in irregular war, the converse is not the case, as often implied: symmetry (or parity) is not synonymous to conventional war. Rather, it is possible to point to a type of warfare that often gets confused with irregular war, which I call ‘symmetric non-conventional warfare.’ This type of warfare is often described as ‘primitive’ or ‘criminal’ war and entails irregular armies on both sides in a pattern resembling pre-modern war. Table 1 maps the three types along the two dimensions of parity between the actors and the resources of the incumbents.

What are the origins of these three types of warfare? I offer the following conjecture. Conventional civil war emerges either out of failed military coups or attempts at secession in federal or quasi-federal states; irregular войны

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war results from peripheral or rural insurgencies; last, ‘symmetric non-conventional warfare’ can be observed in civil wars that accompany processes of state collapse. I shall now briefly discuss each process.

Conventional civil wars take place when an existing army splits, either because of a failed coup (e.g. the Spanish Civil War) or because a unit of a federal or quasi-federal state, which can claim control over a substantial part of the state’s armed forces, attempts to secede (e.g. the American Civil War, the Biafran War). High levels of external support or external intervention in favour of the rebel side may turn an irregular war into a conventional one: this was the case during the late phases of the Chinese Civil War and the Vietnam War. The relative dearth of conventional civil wars can now be explained by the lack of resources on the rebel side.

Irregular civil wars emerge incrementally and often slowly from a state’s periphery. They entail a slow and patient process of state-building by an insurgent organisation. Geography plays a key role in their onset and conduct. An extensive body of research exists on this type of war. Examples include civil wars in Malaya, Mozambique during the Portuguese colonisation, Kashmir, Aceh (Indonesia), and elsewhere.

Symmetric non-conventional wars are much less studied and understood: this is where the haphazard use of the term ‘guerrilla war’ can be particularly misleading. These wars are fought on both sides by irregular armies following a process of state collapse that reflects the fundamental weakness and eventual implosion of the incumbent actor. This entails the disintegration of the state army and its replacement by rival militias, which typically equip themselves by plundering the arsenal of the disbanded army. Several ground-level descriptions of these wars point to similarities with irregular warfare (most notably the absence of regular armies), but they also emphasise key features that set the two apart. This type of warfare differs from conventional civil war because it lacks regular armies and set battles. From an analytical as well as an empirical point of view, it is the presence of frontlines that endows this type of warfare with its distinct feature vis-à-vis irregular warfare and provides the most cogent way to differentiate it from the latter. The presence of frontlines, which take various forms (including roadblocks and checkpoints), has been stressed in many descriptions of symmetric non-conventional wars. Examples include the Lebanese Civil War, the wars in Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia, and Mozambique during independence, and most civil wars that erupted in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Empirical links between warfare and violence

Wars vary enormously across many dimensions and the sources of this variation are highly complex. Clausewitz remarked that the conduct of war is determined by the nature of societies, ‘by their times and prevailing conditions’; in other words, he pointed to their underlying sociology. The
same variation can be observed in civil wars. However, while the sociology of wars has made substantial progress in the course of the last decades, the same cannot be said about civil wars – an indicator of the more general lag in the study of civil wars as compared to interstate ones. Recent research on civil wars is quickly closing the gap, but this research focuses primarily on the determinants of civil war onset, duration and termination, and its effects, rather than civil war per se.

The variation in the intensity of violence within civil wars is perplexing. The form and intensity of violence used by the Russian Reds and Whites during the Russian Civil War; the Serbs, Moslems and Croats in Bosnia; or the various competing factions in Liberia, vary significantly across many dimensions. In some civil wars, the majority of abuses are committed by the incumbents (e.g. Guatemala); in some, there appears to be a balance between incumbents and insurgents (e.g. Peru); and in some others, insurgents seem to carry out the worst atrocities (e.g. Sierra Leone, Mozambique).

The same is true about violence across civil wars. Consider Northern Ireland. Although British authorities have committed human rights abuses, including the systematic practice of torture, they ‘have not ruthlessly and brutally suppressed the population which explicitly or tacitly supports insurrection in the manner experienced by Algerian Muslims, Afghan peasants, Iraqi Kurds, Kashmiri Muslims, Palestinian Muslims and Christians, South African blacks, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Vietnamese peasants’. As an IRA member was told after his arrest by the security forces: ‘If this was Beirut we would just take you out into that yard and shoot you’. Likewise, the IRA ‘sought to avoid any operations that had obviously sectarian overtones: a policeman could be justified as a legitimate target, his non-combatant Protestant family could not’. In short, the conflict in Northern Ireland has been characterised by considerable reciprocal restraint. Such restraint has been absent in many other civil wars. How to explain this variation?

The causes of the cross-national variation in levels, types and practices of violence are multiple and complex, as remarked by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara:

> The enemies of the people act in a more or less intensely criminal fashion according to the specific social, historic and economic circumstances of each place. There are places where the flight of a man into the guerrilla zone, leaving his family and his house, does not provoke any great reaction. There are other places where this is enough to provoke the burning or seizure of his belongings, and still others where the flight will bring death to all members of his family.

Cross-national variation includes the specific profile of political actors and their political ideology; their organisational structure, underlying social basis, and military culture; their resources; their national and local
leadership and strategies; the type of challenges they face; the domestic and international context in which they operate (including prevailing international norms of war); the specific internal and technological dynamics of the war; the degree of militarisation of the conflict; and factors such as geography and climate. It is plausible to surmise that all these factors have an impact on violence.

Given the current state of the theoretical and empirical knowledge, specifying and testing cross-national models to explain this variation in violence remains challenging, to say the least. Conceptual clarification and theoretical development seem to be the wisest starting points. Elsewhere, I take an analytic approach and specify the microfoundations of selective violence. Here, I take a more inductive approach and explore whether a better understanding of how civil wars are fought can help explain why their violence diverges so much.

I shall review seven civil wars covering the entire range of warfare as identified in this chapter, in order to explore whether they correlate with particular patterns of violence. The relation between warfare and violence is not a trivial issue because most victims of civil wars are civilians rather than soldiers. These cases were chosen randomly to vary their political and social basis (ethnic and non-ethnic, secessionist and non-secessionist). They are: Algeria 1954–62, Angola 1961–75, Lebanon 1975–90, Liberia 1987–2003, Nigeria–Biafra 1967–70, Oman 1965–75, and Spain 1936–39. Obviously this is not intended as an exhaustive discussion but rather as a very rough and tentative first-cut overview based mainly on ground-level descriptions.

Conventional civil wars

One of the best known (and most studied) conventional civil war is the Spanish Civil War, which caused a substantial number of civilian casualties. A striking fact is that the greatest amount of violence against civilians took place in the initial months of the war when high uncertainty and the presence of real or suspected ‘fifth-columnists’ (a term invented during that war) behind one’s back subverted the logic of frontlines. Once the frontline was stabilised, fatality rates declined. In other words, violence was used to eliminate known opponents and terrorise their potential sympathisers so as to secure the army’s rear and ensure that a proper conventional war could be fought. Once the frontlines were stabilised, rates of violence went down and rival supporters were given the opportunity to switch sides.

A more recent conventional civil war was the Biafran War (1967–70), the result of the attempt by the Southern Igbo leadership to secede from Nigeria. The Igbo leadership opted against waging a guerrilla war and relied instead on those segments of the national army that had joined the secession to fight a conventional war. Though there were reports of massacres of civilians, this does not seem to have been the predominant form of violence. In fact,
massacres (in the context of mass riots) preceded the war and served as one of its justifications, but stopped while the war was still ongoing. By far, most civilians fatalities resulted from the blockade imposed by the Nigerian Army: they were indirect rather than direct victims.

These two cases suggest that after crossing an initial threshold, conventional civil wars tend to produce violence that resembles the patterns observed in most modern interstate conventional wars: fatalities tend to be primarily military rather than civilian, and civilian fatalities tend to be indirect (‘collateral’) rather than direct. Hence, it is possible to state that the form of warfare correlates with the patterns of fatalities, with the causal arrow apparently going from the former to the latter. At the same time, just turning the war into a conventional conflict may require high levels of violence in the initial stages if the population is intermixed, i.e. when people of questionable loyalty happen to live on the wrong side of the frontline. This suggests the saliency of individual identities (they credibly signal certain courses of action) and their concomitant visibility.37

Irregular civil wars

The war of Algerian independence (1954–62) was a classic war of decolonisation fought as an insurgency, that is to say via irregular warfare. It was a civil war both in strict terms (Algeria was under French jurisdiction, hence this was a domestic conflict) and in a more general sense (Muslim Algerians fought on both sides and the French were also divided, with many leftists taking the side of the independentists). Violence against civilians was plentiful and exercised by both sides. The Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) used violence against French settlers and local competitors, but mainly against ordinary Algerian peasants who for one reason or another refused to collaborate. For instance, the massacre of 123 people (71 of whom were Europeans) on 20 August 1955 in the coastal city of Philippeville was intended to stir up mass support for the revolution by creating a climate of intercommunal tension and induce a mindless repression by the French, which would bring international opprobrium while pushing Algerians to join to the FLN.38 After this and similar tactics failed, the FLN resorted to the systematic use of terrorism, targeting the civilian population, whether it was Algerian Muslims who were known to be ‘friendly’ to France, or Europeans. As a pro-FLN author recalls, ‘it is legitimate to say that it was the violence of terrorism that jolted a good number of us out of our complacency and our reluctance to think about things’.39 However, while the FLN could easily intimidate the countryside, it was having difficulty organising the population in urban areas, where it eventually resorted to tactics such as random bombing. This led to the famous battle of Algiers, which ended with a French victory. On the other side, the French tried various tactics in the countryside, ranging from collective punishment to mass population displacement. While they won in narrowly
military terms, they were unable to sustain the political and economic cost of the war and were forced to negotiate an end to the conflict.

The Algerian case provides a snapshot of two functions of violence: the demonstration or signalling function, whereby violence is used to signal capability, induce mobilisation and attract international attention, and the terrorist function, whereby violence is used to deter civilians from collaborating with the enemy. The outcome is suggestive: high levels of violence from both sides. What is particularly interesting is that although one would expect the violence to follow the ethnic divide (native/Muslim versus settler/Christian), it did not: intra-ethnic violence appears to have been more common than inter-ethnic violence, in a pattern that appears common to many civil wars that are fought via irregular warfare.40

The Angolan war of independence (1961–75) is similar to the Algerian war: a decolonisation conflict fought irregularly. The war began on 4 February 1961 with initial attacks by the independentist MPLA, aimed at freeing political prisoners held by the Portuguese. The immediate Portuguese retaliation was severe: 3,000 Angolan civilians were killed in the streets and in their homes in Luanda, and 5,000 more civilians were massacred in the Malange district. Further, the Portuguese mobilised an army of 80,000, organised local militias and armed the white settler population. Villagers were reportedly napalmed and survivors were executed on the spot. Prairie fires were ignited to prevent the escape of refugees, tens of thousands of whom streamed toward the borders, seeking sanctuary in the Congo.41 Little occurred during the next three years as the MPLA regrouped and opened a new front in 1964 near the Congo border. The MPLA opened a third front in 1966. There were many rumours of Portuguese atrocities, but the insurgents also proved very brutal, both against white settlers and the native population.42 The Angolan case matches the Algerian one in that when violence began it contained a strong demonstration effect along ethnic lines, but then switched to terrorisation and assumed a substantial intra-ethnic character.

Less known is the war in Oman (1965–67), which was fought mainly in the Dhofar region of Southwestern Oman. Although the British played an active role, this was more of a domestic insurgency fuelled by the Cold War than a classic decolonisation war. For both sides, the insurgents and the Sultan’s forces and their British allies, the war was one of attrition, described as a war ‘for the hearts and minds’ of the local population, the Jabalis.43 The insurgents tried several times to open another front in Northern Oman but were unsuccessful each time. This resulted in the fighting being concentrated strictly in the Dhofar region, which although hard to navigate, was a relatively small area in which the government forces were soon able to construct large barricades blocking supply routes to the insurgents (most notably the Hornbeam line). Their main objective was ‘to isolate the insurgent both physically and politically from the population’. To achieve this objective, they burned villages that were not pro-Sultan and hung up the corpses of insurgent
fighters to rot in the centre of Dhofar towns. Additionally, the government organised the so-called *firqa*, groups of defectors from the insurgents who were assigned to fight in the mountainous terrain of Dhofar, where government troops were not performing. The *firqa* were organised on a tribal basis and assigned to their tribal area, which resulted in better information connections. The insurgents were almost eradicated by the war’s end. This war differs from the previous two in that the insurgents were eventually defeated. Violence, however, was plentiful, featuring both an intra-ethnic and terrorist character.

All three cases of irregular war suggest that while the signalling character of violence cannot be ignored, violence was primarily used to terrorise the population and shape its behaviour. In other words, violence is a key resource in irregular wars: it displays a strategic logic, as suggested by its intra-ethnic dimension. What distinguishes irregular civil wars from conventional ones (and possibly from symmetric non-conventional ones) is the willingness of at least one actor to be discriminating, i.e. to try to separate those among the population allegedly supporting their rival actively and systematically from those who do not – and in doing so, to shape the population’s incentives.

**Symmetric non-conventional civil wars**

I now turn to the last type of warfare and examine two cases, Lebanon and Liberia. Unlike most irregular wars, the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90) was equally (if not more) urban as it was rural. A key aspect of this war was the presence of visible boundaries separating sectarian enclaves controlled by various militias. Initially, the frontline at the centre of Beirut shifted for months until it finally settled down and remained pretty much fixed for the rest of the war, dividing the city between eastern and western sectors along the notorious Green Line. The war went through at least five different phases. The first phase lasted one year (1975–6), entailed heavy fighting and eventually ended with a ‘ceasefire’. Subsequently, the war was characterised by sniper-style, sporadic fighting between militias (1976–82). The Israeli invasion of Lebanon brought additional complications and provoked an escalation both in terms of fighting and violence (1982–5). This was followed once more by sporadic militia violence (1985–9) and the so-called rebellion of General Aoun (1989–90), which was accompanied by heavy shelling. Violence was considerable with a lot of looting, but it fluctuated wildly and was not easily traceable. ‘Uncontrolled elements’ (*anassir ghair bundabita*) were allegedly responsible for much (apparently random) violence against civilians. However, many civilians suspected that these men were merely a good excuse for useful activities that could not be openly condoned but were centrally planned and organised by the competing factions. It is estimated that no more than 10 per cent of the casualties involved combatants, and combat was
Violence was widely reported as being practised along ethnic lines, though reliable data are lacking.

Similar features emerge from descriptions of the civil war in Liberia (1987–2003): the violence was considerable, allegedly motivated by ethnic hatred and taking place under territorial segmentation defined by frontlines. The government army quickly turned into an undisciplined ethnic militia, practically indistinguishable from competing ones. Massacres and torture were common and practised by all sides. One of the most vicious attacks of the entire war was the massacre of over 500 civilians that took place on 5–6 June 1993, targeting mostly women and children at a displaced persons camp outside Harbel. Augustine Mahiga, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, described the massacre as follows: ‘They cut throats, they cut heads, threw out brains, opened stomachs and threw out intestines, broke legs, and shot so many bullet wounds that you cannot understand why’. Like the Lebanese Civil War, the Liberian one produced mass civilian displacement and ethnic segregation.

While the Liberian war has been described as a ‘new’ civil war, the same is not the case for Lebanon. Yet the two wars display considerable similarities: state collapse, seemingly gratuitous violence across ethnic lines, and expulsion of populations rather than attempts to win them over. The type of warfare appears to correlate with the patterns of violence and suggests violence that is, on its surface, more ethnically-motivated and indiscriminate than the violence of irregular wars.

A first point is that the features of ‘new’ civil wars are not new. Put otherwise, the imprecise ‘new civil war’ category may, in fact, be capturing a specific type of warfare, namely symmetric non-conventional warfare. A second point, is that the seemingly ethnic and indiscriminate character of the violence (assuming this observation survives systematic empirical research) may represent a lack of resources for collecting finer-grained information, also reflected in the absence of an incumbent actor, rather than motivations that are inherently more ‘ethnic’ or violent, or related to globalisation, etc.

Certain hypotheses about the cross-national variation of violence can be derived. When both political actors enjoy access to informational resources they will try to be discriminating. If one actor has informational resources while the other lacks them, we should observe a skewed pattern of violence with one actor being selective and the other indiscriminate. Last, if both sides lack informational resources, violence should be indiscriminate on both sides. If this is correct, it would mean that warfare is a proximate or intermediate variable between information and violence.

Theoretical links between warfare and violence

Having proposed this conjecture, I identify three theoretical accounts of violence. The first one (which I call the sociological thesis), connects violence
to deep prewar divisions and conflicts (also referred to as ‘polarisation’). In this view, both violence and warfare are just an expression of these pre-existing conflicts; in fact, warfare is a simple intervening variable between polarisation and violence that does not deserve to be studied other than on narrow empirical grounds. The second account (the *Hobbesian* thesis) imputes causal force to the collapse of order that tends to characterise civil wars; warfare under these conditions tends to be inherently barbaric because of the absence of the structures and authorities that have either the incentive or the predisposition to civilise war. Finally, the third account (the military thesis) points to vulnerability as the causal mechanism behind mass civilian victimisation. This is the thesis that places most causal force squarely on warfare, though it appears to be mispecified.

The main theorist of the polarisation thesis, Carl Schmitt, stressed the heavily ideological character of the ‘national liberation’ movements of the decolonisation and Cold War era with deep divisions.\(^5\) In his ‘theory of the partisan’, he argued that the ‘limited and domesticated’ hostility of conventional war turned into the ‘real hostility’ of partisan warfare because of ideological enmity – an insight that is found in many subsequent works and has been adapted specifically to deal with ethnic conflict.\(^5\) However, Schmitt was generalising from a particular historical period and failed to recognise that violence and irregular war have a broader historical connection. Contrary to what was widely believed in the 1960s, irregular war was not invented by Mao Zedong or Che Guevara. As a practice it is as old as warfare, while its theorisation as a military doctrine goes back to the late eighteenth century;\(^5\) the fact that irregular war has survived the end of the Cold War is another indicator of its instrumental (as opposed to ideological) character. In addition, the obvious limitation of this thesis is that it cannot explain the extreme violence of the many civil wars that are not motivated by ideology (even when religion and ethnicity are taken to be ideological differences). Indeed, most symmetric non-conventional wars appear to be highly violent even though they do not seem to be motivated by ideological precepts. Formulated in a falsifiable way, this argument predicts that the deeper the divisions (or the more acute the degree of *polarisation*), the higher the level of violence. The evidence is scant and mixed. From an impressionistic point of view it seems difficult to account for the extreme violence of many recent civil wars in Africa by pointing to patterns of prewar polarisation. I know of only two studies that examine the link between polarisation and violence in a systematic way. Ledesma Vera provides some tentative results that show a relation between levels of prewar polarisation and levels of violence across villages of Aragón during the Spanish Civil War.\(^5\) In a recent paper, Chacón (2003) finds that prewar polarisation as measured by electoral returns at the municipal level in Colombia is a good predictor of violence during the first phase (1946–50) of the civil conflict in that country, known as *Violencia*. This was a period during which the conflict was not militarised and looked a lot
like a generalised riot. However, polarisation ceases to be a good predictor of violence in the second period of the *Violencia* (1958–63), once the situation evolved into a militarised conflict. During this period, geographical and military variables appear much more significantly related to violence. This finding supports the conjecture that in a militarised conflict, warfare has an effect on violence that is independent of polarisation.

The Hobbesian thesis, in the form of an argument stressing the ‘medievalisation’ or criminalisation of war, emerged to tackle various problems with the sociological account. Because irregular warfare presupposes a relative absence of formal structures, it causes a breakdown in military discipline, thus turning war into a cover for decentralised looting banditry, and all kinds of violence against civilians. The absence of professional armies indicates the disappearance of the ‘warriors’ honour’ and its replacement with barbarism. According to van Creveld, contemporary guerrilla wars ‘from Colombia to the Philippines’ is nothing more than ‘the work of ragtag bands of ruffians out for their own advantage, hardly distinguishable from the *ecorcheurs* (‘skinners’) who devastated the French countryside during the Hundred Years’ War’. The weakness of this argument is obviously its failure to account for the violence of conventional civil wars. Formulated in a falsifiable way, this argument predicts that the more irregular the armies, the higher the violence. In Selesky’s formulation: ‘The greater the distance away from centralised monitoring, and probably also the smaller the numbers involved, the greater the opportunity for men to use violence to settle some personal score which may or may not have anything to do with the goals of the society that has authorised them to use purposeful violence in the first place’.

However, empirical support for this contention appears limited. For instance, we know that in many civil wars (e.g. El Salvador, Guatemala) the greatest amount of violence is produced by highly disciplined regular armies rather than insurgent irregulars. The behaviour of the Nazi and Japanese armies in occupied countries during the Second World War is another obvious case. In terms of systematic evidence, it turns out that during the English Civil War atrocities were more common during times and in areas where professional armies operated, rather than where local militias held sway. The single worst massacre in Bosnia, in Srebrenica, was executed in a highly organised fashion by regular troops rather than paramilitary thugs. Recent econometric analysis of evidence from Africa also seems to support the contention that violence against civilians is used to achieve military advantage as opposed to loot and prey.

Last, the military thesis, stressed in many studies of guerrilla warfare, contends that violence results primarily from the acute feeling of vulnerability that combatants experience in the context of irregular war. According to the psychological version of the argument, the absence of frontlines and the presence of the enemy behind one’s back cause uncertainty, fear and even panic, often reaching ‘endemic’ proportions. In turn, this facilitates trigger-
happy reactions, particularly among troops that lack training for irregular war. Violence by disciplined troops, such as the massacre of Vietnamese peasants by US servicemen in My Lai, is often linked to these processes. The problem with this account is that it privileges expressive motivations and conflates levels of analysis. We know that armies do not just behave expressively: there are several incentives at various levels that typically constrain the indiscriminate expression of emotions (such as fear) from the rank and file.

The rationalist variant of vulnerability appears more satisfactory: it links violence specifically to an army’s inability to identify the enemy. In an environment where it is impossible to tell civilian and enemy combatant apart, it pays to err on the side of violence. Hence the inevitable ‘dirty violence’ of counterinsurgency. If the enemy refuses to fight in standard ways and if they prove ‘difficult to subdue using the techniques of “civilised” war, then uncivilised means must be used instead. In short, it is not just that combatants kill people haphazardly out of sheer frustration (though this may well be the case on the ground and at the level of individual motivations), but that violence addresses a basic problem of irregular war. Note that, in spite of its application, this argument applies equally to both incumbents and insurgents, since the latter face a similar identification problem with informers and suffer from betrayal and infiltration. Formulated as a testable hypothesis, this argument would make violence a function of the degree of vulnerability that a military actor faces. Evidence from the Spanish Civil War, where it is possible to hold other factors constant while varying vulnerability, tends to support this argument: recall that most of the violence against civilians during that war took place in the initial months of the war under high uncertainty and fluidity. At the same time, the vulnerability argument predicts that violence will reach its highest level in the most contested areas, where political actors are most vulnerable. However, there is empirical evidence suggesting that this is not necessarily the case. A better version of the rationalist variant of the military thesis awaits specification.

An obvious connection between the theoretical discussion and the empirical examination of warfare is the observation that each mechanism is related to a different type of warfare. Thus, irregular warfare causes violence via military vulnerability, symmetric non-conventional warfare produces violence via anarchy, while the violence in conventional warfare reflects prewar polarisation. Put otherwise, the sociological thesis ‘explains’ the violence of conventional civil wars, the military thesis ‘explains’ the violence of irregular civil wars, and the Hobbesian thesis ‘accounts’ for the violence of symmetric non-conventional war. However, such a fit would also suggest that each theoretical account selects the empirical cases from which it is derived. Since we are concerned about the direction of causality between warfare and violence, this observation means that each theoretical account is biased. The
only way out of this methodological dead-end is to operationalise and test
the three theoretical arguments by deriving their testable implications.

To summarise the main points of this chapter. On the substantive front, I
stress the importance of focusing on information (and the resources necessary
for its collection and assessment) as a crucial variable in the study of civil
war and violence, and suggest the need to identify the factors that account
for variation in the availability of information both across and within
wars. On the theoretical front, I argue in favour of the incorporation of a
theoretical understanding of warfare into the social-scientific investigation
of civil wars. Last, on the methodological front, I hope to have demonstrated
the necessity of combining ground-level empirical analysis and abstract
theoretical reflection rather than thinking of them as divorced or mutually
exclusive.

Notes

* I would like to thank Rhea Myerscough for research assistance.
1 Bruno Shaw, ‘Selections from Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung’, in Sam C.
Sarkesian (ed.), Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Chicago: Precedent Publishing,
1975, p. 223.
2 Ted Swedenburg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian
3 Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri During the
4 Mary Elizabeth Berry, The Culture of Civil War in Kyoto, Berkeley: University of
6 Jan Angstrom, ‘Towards a Typology of Internal Armed Conflict: Synthesising a
7 Jean-Pierre Derriencc, Les Guerres Civiles, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2001,
p. 166. Smith challenges this point, but he does so on the basis of three examples
only. See M. L. R. Smith, ‘Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low
8 The very few irregular interstate wars consist mostly of low-intensity border
skirmishes, such as the Libya–Chad war and the war between Belize and
Guatemala. See Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman, Warfare and the
9 For example, the Russian and Chinese civil wars entailed weak regular armies
operating in huge territory under conditions approximating irregular war. See
Orlando Figes, A People’s Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924, New York:
10 As claimed by Smith, ‘Guerrillas in the Mist’, p. 20.
11 André Beaufre, La guerre révolutionnaire: Les formes nouvelles de la guerre, Paris:
Fayard, 1972, p. 12.
Mark Osanka (ed.), Modern Guerrilla Warfare. Fighting Communist Guerrilla
(1999), p. 84; Fellman Inside War, p. 23.
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19 By ‘quasi-federal’ states I mean states that have devolved a substantial degree of their military authority, particularly through the creation of extensive local and regional militias.


21 A key condition for the emergence of irregular war appears to be a combination of low GDP, dispersed rural settlement and rough terrain. See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, *American Political Science Review*, 97, 1 (2003).

22 For example Valery Tishkov, ‘Ethnic Conflicts in the Former USSR: The Use and Misuse of Typologies and Data’, *Journal of Peace Research*, 36, 5, (1999), p. 585. The process of disintegration is often swift, though sometimes it may be slower.


24 The classic text is Gaston Bouthoul, *Traité de polémologie. Sociologie des guerres*, Paris: Payot, 1970. Recent advances include contributions from what is known as the ‘new military history’ field. Ironically, there seems to be a dearth of theorising about warfare in the field of International Relations.


26 Eamon Collins (with Mick McGovern), *Killing Rage*, New York: Granta Books, 1999, p. 188.

27 Ibid., p. 295.
28 Kevin Toolis, Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA’s Soul, New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997, p. 21.


30 Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992; François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Note, however, that ideology often fails to fit with observed violence. Communist violence was centralised and bureaucratic in the Russian and Greek Civil Wars, but decentralised and ‘anarchic’ in the Finnish and Spanish Civil Wars.


34 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War, manuscript, Yale University, 2004.

35 The most recent reference work on this topic is Santos Juliá (ed.), Víctimas de la guerra civil, Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999.


37 Note, however, that the small number of conventional civil wars suggests that only a limited subset of civil wars where one finds high levels of polarisation and visible identities turn conventional.


39 Ibid., p. 44.


44 Ibid., pp. 49–54.


48 Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy, p. 80ff.

49 The Independent, 7 June, 1993.

But note that not all recent civil wars are symmetric non-conventional ones. The Colombian Civil War is a case in point.

Obviously, this begs the question of what determines the distribution of informational resources in the first place. I will leave this question aside for now.


Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

References


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