

## BOOK REVIEWS

sistent with the attention he gives to other topics throughout the text. If Miller shows a bias, it is found in his seeming favoritism of the modern ecumenical movement. Typographical errors in the text will distract the reader, but they do not detract from the author's accomplishment.

STATHIS N. KALYVAS, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996. Pp. x + 300. \$19.95.

Reviewed by Carl Strikwerda, University of Kansas

Oddly ignored by most non-Catholic historians and political scientists in United States, Christian Democracy, the movement of political parties organized by Catholics in Europe and Latin America, is the largest international political movement after Socialism. Stathis Kalyvas's wide-ranging book on the origin and early development of European Christian Democracy is thus a signal contribution, a broadly interpretive, theoretically informed, and richly researched essay in historical social science. Kalyvas argues that prevalent theories of the origins of Christian Democracy are incorrect. Catholic parties did not arise from the initiative of the Vatican or Catholic bishops, nor were they created by conservative political elites, or rooted in atavistic, pre-industrial loyalties (4–18). Concerned about increasing secularization and anticlericalism, the Church, Kalyvas argues, opposed the formation of highly visible Catholic parties. These, the Church feared, would "be interpreted as a provocation" and the inevitable "backlash" would only strengthen anticlericalism (44). Only the aggressiveness of anticlerical liberals in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, Kalyvas argues, forced Catholic prelates and conservative political elites to tolerate the mobilization of lay Catholics (25–63). But the Church and the conservatives had limited aims. Church leaders wanted to gain back or protest the loss of their institutional privileges. The conservatives sought only to reverse the liberals' electoral victories. Lay Catholics, meanwhile, did not want to create a party to compete with the liberals. They hoped to bring back a holistic Christian society and eliminate the liberal worldview. In other words, they were intent upon a "crusade" against liberalism (127).

Kalyvas skillfully shows how these divergent, and almost contradictory, aims combined to create a situation which none of the actors anticipated or desired. Even though Christian Democracy permanently shattered the Liberal parties in every country, Conservative elites soon were pushed aside by their upstart Catholic populist allies. Despite the popular image among non-Catholics of a monolithic Catholic camp, the Vatican and the episcopate often tried to undercut or control Christian Democratic organizations, while Catholic politicians vigorously opposed the hierarchy by creating populist, mass organizations outside Church control (182–85). The one exception was France, which never evolved a strong Christian Democratic party. Kalyvas rejects many of the usual arguments blaming the episcopate, the peculiarities of French politics, or state centralization (114–66). "Unique to France was the absence of Catholic mass organizations" (148).

Just as the Catholic hierarchy feared, Kalyvas says, Christian Democrats

quickly asserted their independence. While supporting religious education and fighting anticlericalism, on other issues they went their own way and became full participants in pluralist systems. Christian parties, despite their names, increasingly became non-confessional. Even devout Catholic voters, as the common saying goes, vote with one hand and take communion with the other. Although the Vatican had to nurse its dislike of Christian Democrats for decades, its revenge had tragic consequences. Christian Democrats were frequently the crucial foundation for democracy in continental Europe, but the Vatican preferred working with fascist and Nazi dictatorships to sharing power with a Catholic rival (185–7).

My only real criticism of Kalyvas is that because he focuses so much on origins, he portrays the divide between Christian Democrats and the Church as the only one of significance. He thus misses the divides within the Christian Democratic camp. He deals with the Belgian Christian Democrats Charles Woeste and Arthur Verhaegen in the same paragraph as though they were similar on all major issues; in fact, once they together helped found a Belgian Christian Democratic party, they fought each other over virtually every piece of social legislation for next thirty years (229). Since mass organizations are critical to Kalyvas's argument, it is vital to see that organizing economic interest groups involved Christian Democrats in compromises and alliances with socialists and liberals whom the Church and conservatives abhorred. Unsurprisingly, Christian Democrats soon split over these alliances.

Nonetheless, Kalyvas has written an important book, one whose wider implications are provocative for North American Christians. Political parties emerge out of ideology, but their future course is not predicted by ideology. Democracy survives and thrives because of forced compromises which often almost no one wanted. His book also raises the question of what is the best way for a Christian or any religious movement to influence politics in a democratic system. Kalyvas implies that organizing as a pressure group outside of partisan politics may be best way both to have influence and retain one's religious convictions. Ralph Reed and Jesse Jackson may have felt totally frustrated as leaders of minority movements which politicians played to and then frequently ignored, but the alternative of a separate party might have been worse. In any case, Kalyvas opens up a wealth of historical experience for students of social movements, religious politics, and democratic systems.

Jeffrey Chamberlain, in a detailed study of the Anglican clergy of Sussex, suggests a revision of the traditional historical answer given to the question: What happened to the High Church party during the first half of the eighteenth century? Prior to the first few decades of that century, it was generally assumed by ecclesiastics and politicians alike that the conservative theological beliefs of High



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