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Micro-Level Studies of Violence in Civil War: Refining and Extending the Control-Collaboration Model

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The article reviews recent advances in the study of violence in civil wars. It provides a brief description of the baseline “control-collaboration” model, discusses alternatives to it, and reviews recent empirical studies that supply additions, corrections, extensions, and refinements to the baseline model. It highlights some of the assumptions that can be relaxed based on this new research, including the following ones: that in civil war context information is produced exclusively or even primarily by civilian denunciations at the local level; that violence is only used to deter civilian defection; that conflict is always locally dyadic; and that rival factions are organizationally indistinct from each other and resort to similar repertoires of violence. These refinements and extensions have the potential to produce a novel set of predictions that can be tested against both existing and new data. The essay notes the dynamism of this research program and recommends two steps for future research. First, it recommends moving to a higher-level, empirical and theoretical synthesis, by relying on the growing corpus of empirical studies and exploring scope conditions in a much more systematic way than was possible previously. Second, it recommends scaling up the findings of micro-level, subnational studies to the meso and macro-levels, by deriving novel empirical implications and testing them.

Keywords civil war, microlevel studies, subnational research designs, violence

Introduction

The last fifteen years have witnessed an explosion of research on political violence and conflict, with a pronounced focus on the violence taking place in the context of civil wars. The main feature of this research program is a sustained effort to extend the tools of systematic data collection and analysis from highly aggregate country-level data to granular, micro-level data, painstakingly collected at the subnational level. Naturally, and like every new research endeavor, this one has also

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developed in relative anarchy and without much coordination: concepts, measures, and research questions vary and it often seems difficult to reconcile the many, and sometimes, contradictory findings.¹ Nevertheless, this is natural for a new field, especially one that draws from several disciplines and subfields, and relies on a wide variety of methodological approaches.² Indeed, it is already possible to observe a process of aggregation and accumulation. The goal of this essay is to take constructive stock of this process of growth, highlight various connections between different approaches, and suggest future avenues for research.

A preliminary caveat is in place: although the micro-level or sub-national agenda now covers several dimensions of political violence and conflict, including recruitment,³ rebel governance,⁴ group cohesion,⁵ mass displacement,⁶ the organization of genocide,⁷ or the dynamics of military operations,⁸ my focus is on the most developed dimension so far, namely violence against civilian (or “noncombatant”) populations. Although there is now an emerging research agenda on the impact of violence, especially its indiscriminate variety, on military outcomes,⁹ I restrict my discussion to studies that focus on the dynamics of violence rather than its effects, and stress its lethal dimension.¹⁰

I begin with a brief overview of the history of the field. I then turn to a theoretical contribution that provides much of the canvas on which the field is developing, namely the “control-collaboration” model. I review it briefly and then discuss several studies that test, challenge, extend, or refine this baseline model. I move to theories that provide alternative conceptualizations of violence and civil war, and I conclude with a brief discussion of future research directions.

History of the Field

The systematic study of (domestic) political violence can be traced back to a book published in 1935.¹¹ Its author, Donald Greer, sought to provide a general explanation of the nature of the violence exercised by the French Revolutionary authorities during the period of Terror (1793–1794); he did so by focusing on the geographic variation of executions following trials that took place in all French provinces. Greer found that most executions had taken place in Paris, in regions adjacent to the French frontier, and in regions experiencing rebellions against the revolutionary authorities—in other words where the challenge against the revolutionary authorities was credibly seen as being most acute. He argued that these patterns were consistent with an interpretation of the Terror as a political weapon against dissent rather than just an expression of an intolerant ideology; in other words, he concluded, that the Terror was strategic and instrumental rather than ideological. Despite some obvious problems (most notably the absence of a population weight), this study signaled the potential for the quantitative study of conflict, and especially violence. Yet, it took several decades for this potential to begin to be realized, a lag related to the availability of data and the technology of data analysis. It is not surprising that most efforts at quantification began at the highly aggregate level of states—most notably with the Correlates of War (COW) dataset and the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive compiled by Arthur Banks. Perhaps the earliest example of what was to become later the micro-level revolution was Charles Tilly’s 1964 seminal book, *The Vendée*, where he sought to identify the key differences between areas in Western France that rebelled against the French Revolution compared to those that did not.¹² At the same time, this approach was nurtured in the context of the study of

crime, which evolved into the criminology subfield of sociology. It is interesting to note in this respect that the first systematic studies of urban rioting in the U.S. sprang from this criminological tradition,¹³ which later inspired scholars interested in political violence to engage in the collection of detailed micro-level data as the most appropriate way to study ethnic riots. These studies, particularly of Indian Hindu-Muslim riots, displayed a strong geographic focus entailing the comparison of cities where these riots are prevalent to those where they are rare; the pioneering studies of Varshney and Wilkinson set a new standard in the field.¹⁴

The micro-level turn in the study of civil wars took off more recently, mainly for two reasons. First, scholars came to the realization that violence was distinct as a variable from conflict and war.¹⁵ Second, a renewed interest in a set of emerging policy implications gave added weight to the focus on violence. On the one hand, the realization that civilian populations paid a high price in civil wars coincided with the rise of several policy agendas, including humanitarian assistance and intervention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and human rights. On the other hand, the post-September 11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provoked a renewed wave of interest in questions associated with the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency, topics that had been on the back-burner since the end of the Vietnam War.

The Control-Collaboration Model

I begin with a description of the theoretical framework that I developed in *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, one of the first attempts to approach violence against civilians in civil wars from a combined theoretical and empirical micro perspective.¹⁶ This theory features two components. The first one, taking inspiration from well-known insights about insurgency and counterinsurgency, stresses the centrality of the relation between armed groups and civilians for understanding a variety of processes. Seen from this perspective, armed groups must maximize the support they receive from that population and minimize the support that rival groups receive from the same population—put otherwise, they must minimize defection. To achieve this goal, armed groups deploy a variety of instruments, ranging from political persuasion and the provision of public and private goods, all the way to coercion. Building on this foundation, the theory conceptualizes violence as an interaction between armed actors (be they rebel or state-allied actors) and the civilian population, one displaying characteristics associated with asymmetric information: political actors desire information that civilians possess. The importance of information derives from the insight that coercion must be highly targeted (or selective) to be effective, i.e., it must target individuals on the basis of their actions, very much like law enforcement. In contrast, non-selective (or indiscriminate) violence, i.e., violence targeting individuals on the basis of collective profiling (such as their ethnic or religious identity or the place they live), will tend to be counterproductive, leading civilians to seek protection from the rival group, provided this option is available.

Based on this structure of incentives, I specified a baseline “control-collaboration” model, from which I derived a set of empirical predictions about the spatial variation of violence. Space was conceptualized as a five-zone continuum, ranging from areas fully controlled by the incumbents in one end to areas fully controlled by the insurgents in the other end, with three contested zones in between: fully contested in the middle and predominantly controlled by incumbents and insurgents on either side of the fully contested zone. Based on this conceptualization the model

predicts that indiscriminate violence is inversely related to the level of territorial control (i.e., it is more likely where the armed group that resorts to it enjoys very low levels of territorial control), whereas selective violence is most likely where the level of territorial control exercised by an armed group is predominant but not absolute. The model makes a set of additional predictions: about the shift from indiscriminate to selective violence, about the actors likely to use violence in particular places, and about the relation between collaboration and control. Altogether, the model offers a comprehensive yet simple way to make sense of a phenomenon that most observers until then characterized as bewildering or even irrational.

Extending and Refining the Baseline Model

Measuring the level of territorial control exercised by an armed group in a given place and time is of course a difficult and laborious task. I was able to test the empirical predictions of the model in the limited setting of the Greek Civil War, although I provided anecdotal evidence from a broad set of civil conflicts to establish its plausibility. Later on, the baseline model was tested on a different, yet fully comparable and more comprehensive, body of data collected by the U.S. military during the Vietnam War: the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).¹⁷ The findings were consistent with the model; the analysis showed that selective violence by the Vietcong was much more common in hamlets that were predominantly, but not fully, controlled by them than it was in hamlets that were fully under Vietcong control, hamlets that were contested between the rival sides, or hamlets under predominant or full government control. Furthermore, the counterinsurgents bombed and shelled most heavily hamlets that were under total Vietcong control. Overall, the absence of spatial overlap between insurgent selective and incumbent indiscriminate violence, as well as the relative absence of violence from contested areas, are both consistent with the model.

Since the publication of *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, a number of studies have tested the external validity of the baseline model and suggested a number of important qualifications and extensions, thus illustrating the process of accumulation at work in the field. In a well-crafted paper, Gonzalo Vargas collected extensive data on territorial control and selective violence in a single Colombian city that experienced significant violence between 1996: Barrancabermeja; this was a period when the Colombian paramilitaries (initially of the *Autodefensas de Santander y Sur del Cesar* or AUSAC and later of the *Bloque Central Bolivar* or BCB) wrested control of several neighborhoods of the city from the rebels of the ELN and the FARC.¹⁸ Vargas found that, as the conflict for Barrancabermeja went on, violence gradually shifted from indiscriminate to selective, especially on the incumbent side, which is consistent with the predictions of the baseline model. However, he also found that while the paramilitaries were relatively selective in the violence they dispensed in areas they controlled or nearly controlled, they were also surprisingly able to deploy selective violence in areas that were near-controlled by the insurgents. At the opposite end, insurgent violence was also found to be selective in zones where rebels had little control, but also in areas where the two sides approached parity. In addition, Vargas found a substantial difference in the levels of violence used by the two sides. These departures from the baseline model led him to suggest and explore a number of additional mechanisms. More specifically, he argues that the generally low level of selective violence exercised by the rebels may have been an

artifact of the reliance of the baseline model on homicides as the exclusive indicator of violence—as opposed to other forms of violence short of murder; indeed, he found that the rebels tended to rely on kidnappings and expropriation of assets more than on lethal violence. He also points out that the paramilitaries derived their intelligence primarily from guerrilla defectors rather than civilian collaborators, thus questioning the baseline model's link between denunciation and information (and, therefore, the content of the relation between territory and violence). In fact, the dearth of paramilitary collaborators in areas controlled by the rebels (since they were not needed), may also explain why rebel selective violence was relatively low and took non-homicidal forms. As for the “oversupply” of paramilitary violence in areas they controlled, Vargas argues that economic activities such as the contraband of stolen petrol and the creation and maintenance of a protection racket, but also so-called social cleansing operations and the enforcement of newly imposed codes of good conduct, led to violence that was used for purposes other than curbing collaboration with the enemy.¹⁹ This is an important point, as it questions the link between the use of violence and the minimization of defection. Overall, Vargas' analysis points to a number of useful qualifications and extensions of the control-collaboration model: non-lethal violence, non-civilian sources of information, non-defection curbing uses of violence, and different repertoires of violence tied to the identity of armed actors.

In a similar fashion, and in two related papers, Ravi Bhavnani, Dan Miodownik, and Hyun Jin Choi used data from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in West Bank and Gaza to test and extend the baseline model.²⁰ Their findings are largely consistent with the baseline model, but they also differ from it on certain dimensions, especially once the different phases of the conflict are disaggregated. For instance, they find that Israel was more likely to use selective violence in areas largely controlled by Palestinian factions, while areas of incomplete Israeli control were less prone to selective violence; furthermore, zones of mixed control witnessed moderate levels of selective violence, mainly by Israel. This “oversupply” of incumbent selective violence, they point out, can be traced to the quality of information available to the Israelis. Bhavnani et al. argue that these results can be explained if one relaxes an assumption of the control-collaboration model positing near-symmetric or comparable power between the rival political actors. When positing instead a huge power differential between the two sides (as is the case between Israel and the Palestinians) and, furthermore, when overlaying on this power asymmetry an insurgent split among competing factions (Fatah and Hamas in the case at hand), then it is possible to derive a different distribution of violence, with the stronger actor able to generate information and, therefore, violence in areas strongly controlled by the rebels. More generally, Bhavnani et al. emphasize the importance of factionalism and the complications introduced by non-dyadic forms of interaction for the production of violence.²¹

In another article, Rex Douglass returns to the Vietnam War to tackle the puzzle of what appears to be a relative ineffectiveness of selective violence.²² In an interesting move, he theoretically links the processes of selective and indiscriminate violence, to argue that a credible threat of random targeting could induce civilians to provide armed actors with information, which then enables the targeting of specific individuals in a selective fashion. Using a variety of sources from the Vietnam War, including an extended version of the HES, he finds that government selective violence disproportionately targeted contested and partially rebel controlled areas, where according to the logic of the baseline model civilians should have been reluctant to share information due to a high likelihood of rebel retaliation. He also finds that

the government was able to generate intelligence even in contested and rebel areas, and communities that provided more information were targeted with more selective violence but less indiscriminate violence. The hypothesized underlying mechanism fits with both Vargas' and Bhavnani et al.'s point about the link between denunciation, information, and violence: given overwhelming resources, an armed actor can generate useful information bypassing civilians motivated by highly targeted (and therefore credible) threats, including by interrogating civilians and enemy defectors or by threatening collective punishment. Additionally, one can think of additional factors operating in the same direction: the length of the Vietnam War or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, along with the frequency of changes in territorial control may have contributed to diffuse detailed information beyond the confines of territory controlled by a rival actor. These processes may also have been facilitated by the urban context of the conflict studied by Vargas and Bhavnani et al.

A number of other studies point to a different variable, shifts in territorial control rather than territorial control *per se*. For instance, an abrupt and significant loss of territorial control, especially by rebel groups, could lead to higher levels of civilian abuse. Relying more on anecdotal observations than systematic data, Metelits argues that insurgents establish a beneficial relationship with local populations and exhibit restraint when they are able to exercise monopoly control over the extraction of local resources. However, when faced with competition from rival groups, insurgents are likely to become increasingly coercive toward civilians, as they are trying to maintain their control over these crucial resources.²³ Using detailed data from Angola, Ziemke also argues that civilian abuse is likely to go up with a loss of control,²⁴ the mechanism here is that armed groups that are losing ground are willing to use violence in order to instill fear sufficient to prevent mass civilian defection, a point echoing Kalyvas' similar observation made with data from the Algerian Civil War.²⁵ This hypothesis is observationally equivalent with an alternative conceptualization of violence, proposed by Eck and Hultman and Hultman.²⁶ Rather than seeing violence as an outcome of the interaction between armed groups and civilians, they conceptualize it as an outgrowth of the military competition between armed groups. Focusing particularly on rebel groups, they argue that they target civilians in order to place themselves in a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the government by imposing political and military costs on the government—the rationale being that the civilian population will then blame the latter for its failure to protect them against insurgent violence. A key empirical prediction of this argument is that they will be prone to targeting civilian populations when and where they lose ground. Naturally, arguments that imply an interaction between armed groups and civilian populations are consistent with both the logic and predictions of the baseline model which stresses the imperative of preventing civilian defection, something that becomes particularly salient when territorial losses and military defeats mount up. Clearly, approaches that point to shifts in territorial control and interactions between competing armed actors offer the possibility of several refinements for the baseline model.

Expanding the Scope Conditions of the Baseline Model

So far, I discussed approaches that cling closely on the baseline model: they adopt its basic premises and seek to qualify and extend some of its assumptions. However, the micro-level revolution has also been visible in some approaches that either seek to

expand the scope conditions of the baseline model or provide alternative conceptualizations of the process of violence. The two most interesting ones are the Hobbesian and the polarization approaches. I argue that both could be made compatible with the baseline model and can be used to extend its reach.

The Hobbesian approach conceptualizes violence in a fundamentally different way from the control-collaboration model: not as an interaction between armed groups and civilians entailing a strategic or instrumental logic, but as an outgrowth of an innate human propensity for violence. Often, this approach opts for blanket statements rather than clearly falsifiable claims.²⁷ Recently, however, there have been efforts to refine it.²⁸ Perhaps the most successful such approach has been Jeremy Weinstein's *Inside Rebellion*.²⁹ Weinstein argues that the violence of armed groups against civilians is an unintended byproduct of the organizational profile of armed groups rather than the outcome of their intentional pursuit of specific goals. "Resource-wealthy" groups will attract opportunistic individuals (or "consumers") while "resource-poor" groups, forced to rely on "social endowments" such as political ideology or ethnic and religious identities, will attract highly committed individuals (or "investors"). The main prediction is that "resource-wealthy" organizations will mete out lots of violence, and most of it of the indiscriminate kind, while "resource-poor" organizations will develop cooperative relations with noncombatants, elicit genuine support, and exhibit restraint. The brutal and widespread abuse of noncombatants by insurgent forces, Weinstein argues, is often an unintended consequence of an organizational strategy that appeals to the short-term material benefits of potential recruits (who are naturally violent—hence the Hobbesian logic of the argument). Humphreys and Weinstein test a version of this argument with data from Sierra Leone and find support for it.³⁰ Hoover also points to organizational characteristics as a key factor in explaining the level and type of violence used by armed actors, though her logic diverges from Weinstein's.³¹ Rather than resources, it is ideology that makes armed groups different, she argues. Based on a detailed study of the Salvadoran Civil War, she finds that a key factor differentiating the "violence profile" of armed groups lies in the type of training and education they implement. The main contribution of these approaches is to highlight the characteristics and internal structure of armed actors. Yet, this dimension can easily be incorporated into the baseline model and provide interesting predictions about their information collection and defection prevention strategies. In other words, one could use the organizational predictions of Hobbesian approaches without necessarily adopting its fundamental premises.

A second approach sees violence as an outcome of social polarization. The crude version can be found in the primordialist or "ancient hatred" version of ethnic enmity, positing violence as an unproblematic outgrowth of ethnic identities. As with the Hobbesian approach, however, it is possible to generate empirical predictions that can be disconnected from the original premises—which is what Balcells has done recently.³² By focusing on the Spanish Civil War, a war that was fought conventionally, Balcells observed that the combination of high levels of violence behind the frontlines coupled with the absence of contested territory due to conventional mode of warfare, pointed to a different logic of violence: the very high premium on information, so characteristic of irregular wars, was missing here. What could then explain the persistence of violence behind the frontlines of a conventional civil war? This observation led her to study the political (rather than simply organizational) characteristics of the rival factions, and their connection to the civilian population via political preferences and

identities formed prior to the war. Indeed, the armed groups fighting in the Spanish Civil War were the armed wings of pre-existing political parties. Using highly disaggregated data, she found that the initial “round” of violence against civilians was higher in communities where prewar electoral competition between rival political factions produced electoral results that approached parity; moreover, she found that subsequent “rounds” of violence were more sensitive to the dynamics of the war, as opposed to prewar political factors: they were highly correlated with the initial levels of violence, suggesting a logic of both rivalry and revenge. Moreover, the mechanism underlying this process entailed a process of interaction between armed actors and civilian populations that echoes the logic of the control-collaboration model, but with a logic reflecting the different incentives imposed by conventional warfare.

These simultaneous (yet clearly distinct) endogenous-exogenous dynamics of violence are consistent with a recent study of violence during the Bosnian War, indicating a fundamental similarity between the dynamics of ethnic and ideological cleavages.³³ Like Balcells, Weidmann finds that the dynamics of violence in Bosnia can be explained by simultaneous processes of ethnic competition that preceded the war and strategic logics induced by the war itself. This strand of research is important because it moves us away from simple yet crude distinctions between ethnic and non-ethnic wars or from an analysis of ethnicity that remains wedded to superficial indicators, such as ethnic fractionalization; it suggests, instead, a deeper logic of political cleavages which find their expression in armed conflict, while also being shaped by it.

Conclusion

This brief overview illustrates the exceptional dynamism of the research on the dynamics of violence in civil wars. Ultimately, the need for high-quality data has proved to be an advantage more than an obstacle: by forcing researchers to dig deeper for better data, it has generated a push toward theoretical and empirical disaggregation that would have been just impossible to imagine only a few years earlier. For a cross-section of researchers, the call for better data has led to a much closer engagement with the nitty-gritty of conflict that has usually been the case for quantitatively-oriented researchers, a welcome corrective following the initial wave of rather superficial, cross-national research on the topic.³⁴

And yet, an overarching question remains: can these studies, based on data from different conflicts and using different measures and units of analysis lead to accumulation? My answer is positive. There are at least two ways to do that. The first is to begin synthesizing existing research in a much more sustained way. Rather than seek to produce always a new theory per paper (or book), the goal should be rather to incorporate new findings into existing theories, by extending and refining them. I have suggested one possible way of doing so, via the baseline control-collaboration model. This model is simple enough to allow for the incorporation of additional dimensions. For example, it is possible to relax the assumption that information can be produced only or even primarily by civilian denunciations at the local level; that the conflict is locally dyadic only; that rival factions are organizationally indistinct from each other and display similar repertoires of violence; or that violence only serves to deter civilian defection. Such refinements and extensions can produce a novel set of predictions that can be tested both against existing and new data.

The second way is to scale-up by generating testable implications derived from the micro level and testing them at the meso- and macro-levels. For example, the observation that there exist systematic differences between rebel organizations was instrumental in generating a set of hypotheses about deep differences between civil wars fought during the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods.³⁵ The micro-level research agenda is presently full of insights that can be scaled up in a similar way. This scaling-up ought to also generate more precise scope conditions that would help delineate and synthesize the micro-level findings. For example, does fighting in an urban environment generate dynamics that are systematically distinct from those that emerge in rural settings; if yes, what are their implications for other forms of urban violence—such as those associated with organized crime or electoral violence? These are the type of questions that will help make a vibrant research program even more vibrant.

Notes

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2. This diversity is explored in Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud, eds., *Order, Conflict, and Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

3. Ana Arjona and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Recruitment into Armed Groups in Colombia: A Survey of Demobilized Fighters,” in Yvan Guichaoua, ed., *Understanding Collective Political Violence: Conflict, Inequality and Ethnicity* (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), 143–171; Christopher Blattman, “From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 2 (2009): 231–247; Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 4 (2011): 496–528; Kristine Eck, *Raising Rebels: Participation and Recruitment in Civil War* (PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, Uppsala University, 2010); Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 2 (2008): 436–455; Jocelyn S. Viterna, “Pulled, Pushed, and Persuaded: Explaining Women’s Mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army,” *American Journal of Sociology* 112, no. 1 (2006): 1–45.

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5. Paul Staniland, *Explaining Cohesion, Fragmentation, and Control in Insurgent Groups* (PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010).

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8. Jason Lyall, “Are Co-Ethnics More Effective Counter-Insurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 1 (2010): 1–20.

9. Matthew Adam Kocher, Tom Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (2011): 1–18; Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 3 (2009): 331–362; Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “How Free is “Free-Riding” in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” *World Politics* 59, no. 2 (2007): 177–216.

10. For instance, I do not discuss the mass displacement of civilian populations, a common feature of civil wars, or sexual violence, a much more variable one. See Abbey Steele, “Seeking Safety: Avoiding displacement and choosing destinations in civil wars,” *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 419–429; and Morten Bergsmo, Alf B. Skre, and Elisabeth

Jean Wood, eds., *Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes* (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic Epublisher, 2012).

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16. Ibid.

17. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, "The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 3 (2009): 335–355.

18. Gonzalo Vargas, "Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence From a Colombian City," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21, no. 1 (2009): 110–132.

19. Although the profit-related dimension of violence has been mentioned often in the literature, it has rarely been investigated in a systematic way. See David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper*, no. 320, 1998. This dearth of systematic research may be related to the multiplicity of motivations contained in a single act of violence.

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21. Factionalism and non-dyadic interactions have received a lot of attention recently, although not in relation with violence. See Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, "A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars," *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 265–283. Non-dyadic interactions may be overblown, however, when it comes to the study of the dynamics of violence because non-dyadic conflict may be compatible with locally dyadic conflict.

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25. Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society* 11, no. 3 (1999): 243–285.

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