Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobilization
Beyond Christian Democracy

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In March 1998 the leaders of the European Popular Party (the European federation of Christian Democratic parties) decided to oppose Turkey’s application for membership in the European Union (EU). The Belgian chairman of the Christian Democratic group in the European parliament, Wilfried Martens, pointed out, “In our view Turkey cannot be a candidate for EU membership. We are in favour of extensive cooperation with Turkey, but the European project is a civilizational project. Turkey’s candidature for full membership is unacceptable.” The Islamic factor (including the presence and rise of political Islam) was presented as key in the Christian Democratic decision.

This statement says more about Christian Democracy than about Turkey. Although Islam was only one among several factors that influenced the Christian Democratic position (other factors included Turkey’s political situation, human rights record, economy, and immigration potential), the reference to Islam by the European Christian Democrats is interesting insofar as it does not reflect a sectarian rejection of Islam but rather an acknowledgment of the dangers posed by the kind of politics that are informed by a religious cleavage—what I call “unsecular politics.” Unsecular politics refer to a political context in which religious ideas, symbols, and rituals are used as the primary
(though not exclusive) instrument of mobilization by at least one major political party (i.e., a credible contender for power). The outright condemnation by the heirs of European unsecular politics of its contemporary manifestation in other parts of the world is then indicative of two related facts—their profound political amnesia and their extremely successful integration into a liberal-secular political framework, in other words, their successful secularization.

Is it possible to lump together two seemingly different phenomena such as nineteenth-century European political Catholicism and contemporary Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East? Here, I argue the merits of such a comparison by focusing on the main manifestation of unsecular politics: religious mobilization. In the first section I discuss the causes of the political and scholarly amnesia of European Christian Democracy’s origins. I argue that this amnesia and the tendency to reject outright religious mobilization across the world share common causes. In the second section I focus on religious mobilization. I argue that despite widely differing religious doctrines and political and social environments, it is possible to identify a core phenomenon, religious mobilization—much as it is possible to study labor or ethnic mobilization across cultures, space, and time. I then identify the key features of religious mobilization: (a) an “antisystem” critique of liberal institutions relying on religious rhetoric; (b) the reconstruction of existing religious identities rather than just their mobilization; (c) a mass mobilization relying on the wide use of selective incentives and a concomitant focus on economic and social issues; (d) a cross-class appeal; and (e) links to pre-existing religious institutions. Although individual religious parties differ from each other in many respects, these five components tend to be constant across time and space. Identifying these commonalities enables one to address the issue of the incorporation of these parties into liberal-democratic institutional frameworks from a novel and more fruitful perspective, which I sketch in the third section. Specifically, I focus on the institutional features that facilitate or discourage the gradual transformation of unsecular into secular politics through the moderation of religious mobilization drawing on cases as diverse as nineteenth-century Belgium, Algeria, and India, among others. Overall, I integrate Christian Democracy into an analysis of contemporary religious developments in non-European politics. In so doing, I aim to show that the legacy of European Christian Democracy transcends its temporal and spatial boundaries and carries a broader significance.
Amnesia about the (mostly) Catholic religious mobilization in Europe is not limited to European Christian Democrats. It also features prominently in many studies of contemporary Christian Democracy, where it takes the form of retrospective extrapolation: because contemporary Christian Democratic parties are liberal and secular it is assumed that they could never have been aliberal and unsecular in the past—or that if liberal elements were present, they were somehow prevented by Christian theology from “contaminating” (liberal) political regimes. Retrospective extrapolation is methodologically fallacious; this particular one is also empirically flawed.²

A central cause and symptom of retrospective extrapolation is the overwhelming power bestowed on ideology: according to a widely held perception, democratization and democratic consolidation are directly linked to the (stated or interpreted) “disposition” of particular world religions (and their “political arms”) with regard to liberal democracy. Thus it is often argued that Catholicism and Islam, however defined, are by nature compatible or inimical to liberal democracy. Countless debates then emerge, almost always structured around this dichotomous premise.

Yet such arguments are problematic in two ways. First, they give axiomatic value to the assumption that policy is the exclusive, automatic, and natural derivative of ideas; second, they essentialize ideas by putting forth a single and unified version of, say, Catholicism or Islam. However, religious doctrine, like all kinds of doctrines, is a contested field of meaning, amenable to a multiplicity of cultural expressions, interpretations, and political arrangements, and lending itself to multiple and continuous modifications, manipulations, and reinventions. Both Catholicism and Islam have been used to support a variety of regimes—democracy, dictatorship, republicanism, monarchy, and empire. Furthermore, ideology, especially in its theological dimension, can be a particularly flawed predictor of political action. Not only is it elastic and shifting, but it is only one among many factors that motivate social and political action. Its inadequacy as a predictor of action is revealed by an example from Iran. Shi’ite traditions recommend avoidance of direct participation by religious leaders in governments as demeaning to spiritual authority. However, Khomeini revised Shi’ite political thinking: he condemned traditional Shi’ite quietism and the
practice of *taqiya* (dissimulation), arguing that the *ulamas* could rule directly. The Iranian revolution led to government by religious leaders and the creation of a clerical organization with the functional equivalent of a hierarchy of archbishops, bishops, and priests—a true revolution within Islam. Ideological discourse can be an even worse indicator of future intentions. Statements of Islamist leaders in favor of democracy can be rejected as strategic posturing that obscures true intentions while open condemnations of democracy can be interpreted as reflecting true intent, thus acquiring the status of proof—and vice versa.

An additional problem of retrospective extrapolation is that it tends to view religious movements as mere political arms of organized religions and to conflate the statements and ideology of the two. Retrospective extrapolation carries an important consequence: it shifts our attention away from political and religious actors and institutions and toward endless and confusing argumentation about the content of theologies. According to Abdon Filali-Ansary, “Many controversies surrounding Islamic thought focus so heavily on semantics, on names for ideas and persons, that the real issues often disappear from sight.” In fact, the “real issue” is precisely the interpretation of sacred texts, and this interpretation is the very object of political contention.

Retrospective extrapolation is not exclusive to religion. It is part of a view that holds the explicit commitment to democracy by the main political and social actors as a fundamental condition for the emergence and consolidation of democratic regimes: democratization requires the adoption by nondemocrats of democratic values. For example, the presence of “anti-system” parties has traditionally been considered a key indicator of the stability of a democratic regime.

In the case of religious movements, this view requires a transformation of their ideology through reinterpretation of sacred texts—nothing short of “an Islamic Reformation.” The main research implication of this view is a shift of focus to the determination of the sincerity of the espousal of democracy by religious actors. However, this can prove a futile exercise: ideological statements and political declarations are open to any interpretation, and future political action is not necessarily or always a faithful reflection of present ideological positions. Political history is replete with radical parties that became reformist. While it is true that the adoption of democratic values by all major political actors is a correlate of long-term
democratic consolidation, it would be incorrect to argue that democratization requires such a commitment. Moreover, the initial compliance of political actors to democratic rules does not necessarily flow from their ideological preferences; it can be the result of the largely contingent strategic pursuit of their interests under constraints.\textsuperscript{10} Democracy can be a spontaneous and self-enforced equilibrium, possible in the initial absence of convinced democrats or mass democratic culture. The uncertainty about the outcome of political competition that is inherent to democracy, as well as the iteration that is built into the democratic process, can then transform initial commitments into long-term values. Hence democratic consolidation can be a largely endogenous process.\textsuperscript{11}

It is my contention, therefore, that the study of religious mobilization requires that we take religious doctrines for what they are, that is, flexible and malleable statements of often ambiguous political intent, as opposed to rigidly predictive policy platforms. Hence we need to move beyond political theologies, semantics, ideology, and the search for the “essence” or the “correct interpretation” of religious doctrines and focus on actors and institutions. This requires neither a reference “to an ‘absolute of divine origin’” nor “the mobilization of all resources of religious history and thought.”\textsuperscript{12}

**RELIGIOUS MOBILIZATION AND UNSECULAR POLITICS**

I call “religious mobilization” a political mobilization based on the use and appropriation of religious symbols and rituals. I use the terms “religious parties” and “religious movements” generically to refer to the political actors that rely on religious mobilization. Whether or not the use of religious symbols is sincere is irrelevant—for two reasons. First, religion is never found in a “clean” state, unpolluted by other kinds of concerns. Second, no matter how “sincere” the intentions behind the use of religion (i.e., untainted by political and strategic considerations), its infusion into politics is typically accompanied by its dilution—very much like the injection of class into politics.\textsuperscript{13}

Religious mobilization can be best analyzed and understood in comparative perspective. Often, the case study format leads to flawed comparisons between the case at hand and the author’s vague or flawed perception
of other cases. For example, Eric Kolodner argues that the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is not a religious movement “akin to the Islamist movement in the Middle East,” in spite of its use of religious symbols and rituals, because its members are motivated to join by economic grievances; however, he ignores that similar grievances have been motivating the members of Islamist parties, such as the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).

Religious mobilization can be disaggregated into four essential components.

1. An “antisystem” critique of liberal institutions relying on religious rhetoric. Religious mobilization is centrally informed by a critique (going as far as uncompromising rejection) of secular and liberal political institutions and more generally of the liberal creed that holds that whereas politics belongs to the public sphere, religion should be assigned to the private sphere. This is true of religious movements and parties, both radical and reformist, operating in nonauthoritarian, semiauthoritarian, or authoritarian political contexts. Although religious parties that emerge in authoritarian or semiauthoritarian contexts criticize existing authoritarian institutions as arbitrary, they do not advocate the introduction of liberal democracy. Insofar as they compromise on democratization, they do it with an eye toward using liberal institutions as a stepping-stone to their preferred (religiously inspired) regime.

While the association between Catholicism and democracy may appear natural to contemporary Christian Democrats, this was not the case in the past. The ideology of the emerging Catholic movements in the 1860s and 1870s was informed by the Catholic Church’s clear and unabashed opposition to liberal democracy—as expressed in the Syllabus errorum pronounced by the pope in 1864 that denounced freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience and religion, legal equality of cults, sovereignty of the people, the doctrine of progress, separation of state and church, liberalism, and the modern conception of civilization. The Church condemned as a grave error the belief that a regime that did not repress the violators of Catholic religion could be good. The German historian C. Weber has termed this project “ultramontane fundamentalism.”

An illustration of this trend is provided by the Belgian case. The Belgian Catholic movement adopted a strongly antiliberal posture during the 1870s. It aspired to revive Catholicism and “Christianize” modernity in
response to the rise of liberalism and the secularization of European states. Clerical and lay Catholic thinkers adopted the ultramontane project and unequivocally rejected political liberalism, democratic government, and the separation of church and state; they also advocated the liberal revision of the 1830 (liberal) Belgian constitution. The revival and radicalization of Catholic Catholicism was not a matter of mere ideological declarations. The Catholic Church became the agent of sustained mass mobilization, in its own words, "a crusade against Liberalism," that began in the religious realm but quickly acquired a social and political character. The objective was to use liberal institutions to destroy them. As the prominent radical Belgian Catholic thinker Camile de Hemptinne put it:

What should subjects do if the law is indifferent and places error and truth on the same level, as it does in Belgium? . . . They must lament having to live under a regime so opposed to the rule of God and do everything they can to change it. To this effect, and since the law allows them to, they will use freedom to do good: to redress the ideas, expose the true principles, and spread the understanding of how much God abhors these general freedoms [of speech, press, conscience and religion, etc.].

More generally, cross-national research suggests that there is an association between Catholicism, absence of democracy, and limited or late democratic development. One can also look at interwar Austria and Portugal and postwar Portugal and Spain to discover authoritarian governments using Catholic discourse and relying strongly on the support of the Catholic Church. To use the fact that nineteenth-century European confessional parties did not overthrow existing liberal regimes in order to claim that they never posed a danger is to ignore a central fact: with one exception, these parties did not subvert liberalism because they could not. With the exception of Belgium, no confessional party won a parliamentary majority; they were either confined to the opposition or accepted as junior partners in coalition governments where their impact was necessarily limited.

One of the most commonplace arguments in the post–Cold War world is that Islamism has emerged as the most implacable enemy of liberal democracy. An extreme but hardly exceptional version of this view was expressed by the French foreign affairs minister following the electoral
breakthrough of the Islamist party FIS in Algeria: "Unfortunately, the Muslim nature of Algerian society won over civilization."21 Indeed, Islamist movements seek power using religious appeals. They criticize liberal institutions and promote a theocratic project built around religious law (shari'a) and antagonistic to secular and liberal democracy.

The main arguments that posit the incompatibility of Islamism and liberal democracy run along three lines: (a) empirical, based on the practice of existing Islamist states, particularly Iran; (b) circumstantial, based on the rejection of liberal democracy by many Islamist thinkers; and (c) structural, based on the purported absence from Islamic theology and culture of the essential ingredients and fundamental values of Western liberalism.22 The Christian Democrats' statement about Turkey was informed by the last category, which stresses the antidemocratic and antimodern essence of Islamic thought and tradition: Islam requires divinely rooted sovereignty as opposed to popular sovereignty; state legitimacy derived from the application of shari'a and fusion of religion and politics (din wa-dawla) as opposed to separation of state and church and legislation without reference to religion; overlap of the political community with the community of believers (ummah) and hence exclusion of nonbelievers and women; rejection of political pluralism (which places on an equal footing the true "party of God" and other parties) and of majority rule (because this is based on the false idea that issues of right and justice can be quantified and disregard religiously defined morality).

Critics of this argument point out that it is based on the flawed assumption that there is one Islam, timeless and eternal, whose character is essential, primordial, and constant; the failure to grasp the breadth and depth of contemporary Islam and Muslim politics, they argued, leads to mystification. Instead, there exist different and contradictory Islamic traditions, both across time and space. Many Islamic thinkers have offered interpretations qualifying or even rejecting the concept of the indivisibility of the political and religious realms. Finally, a careful reading of the historical record indicates that politics and religion became separable not long after the death of the Prophet and the establishment of dynastic rule.23 Both proponents and critics of the nondemocratic essence of Islam derive their arguments from different interpretations of basically the same theological corpus of Islamic doctrine and tradition. For instance, a well-developed exercise is the search for elements of Islamic law and tradition that could assist the
development of some form of democracy. Such elements, compatible to the cognate principles that belong to the intellectual heritage of liberal democracy, include a disinclination to arbitrary rule, a contractual and consensual perception of sovereignty, the qualities of dignity and humility, and values such as shura (consultation), ijtihad (independent reasoning), and ijma (consensus).\textsuperscript{24} In its most extreme and absurd version, this approach seeks elements of Islamic thought that could literally mimic landmarks of the historical and philosophical evolution of the West, such as the Protestant Reformation.\textsuperscript{25} However, this is a misreading of both Islamic tradition and the history of the West, as it posits a single universal path to democracy while assuming as well that democracy only developed in Protestant countries! Plus, as Olivier Roy points out, one should not forget that the Protestant Reformation was based on a fundamentalist mode of thought.\textsuperscript{26} As I pointed out, this debate is pointless: whether Muslim countries can adopt liberal democratic institutions or whether Islamic movements can operate under such institutions is a question that cannot possibly be answered within the framework of the discussion on the philosophical foundations of Islam.

A similar debate, anchored in conflicting interpretations of the connection between Hindu discourse, secularism, and religious toleration, has taken place with regard to recent political developments in India.\textsuperscript{27} This debate has emerged following the impressive rise of religious mobilization in India (often referred to as the “Saffron Surge”). The Indian BJP has been described as “the largest movement of religious nationalism in the world.”\textsuperscript{28} The use of religious appeals and rituals has been central to its rise: images of Hinduism’s Mother Goddess and religious festivals such as Dashehra (an autumn festival celebrating the victory of Rama, the Hindu embodiment of virtue over its archenemy) have been infused with politics, with mass Hindu organizations playing a central role—or even substituting traditional religious authorities. For example, the most solemn religious day of the year, the day of guru worship, has been turned into a heavily political festival in which the leaders of the Hindu mass organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National Volunteer Corps) have substituted themselves for the traditional gurus and participants present the organization with monetary offerings; its banner is worshiped as a symbol of Hindu power and solidarity.\textsuperscript{29} The BJP’s quick rise led to serious concern: If the BJP came to power, Ashutosh Varshney argued, it would mean “the end of India as we know it civilationally (and perhaps also territorially). As Ayodhya has
shown, the right wing is bigoted, communal, and exclusionary. Hatred is the cornerstone of its politics.”⁰ The BJP’s successful bid for power in 1996 provoked open alarm: “Never before has India been so deeply polarized along religious lines, never before has the rest of the world been so alarmed by the sudden shift to the right of the world’s second-most populated country.”¹¹ The party’s rise in the wake of religion-driven agitation that culminated, in December 1992, in the destruction by thousands of Hindu marchers of the Babri Masjid mosque in the town of Ayodhya (said to lie on the site where Ram, the god-king of ancient history was born) and its 1996 electoral victory were widely seen as a threat to both secularism and the Muslim minority in India. Indeed, a key tenet of the BJP’s agenda was the abolition of the special marriage, divorce, and property laws applying to Muslims.

There are, obviously, many differences of doctrine, law, institutions, and values among world religions (as well as within them). One often-cited difference pertains to the relations between state and church. Christian states, it has been pointed out, have distinguished between throne and altar, whereas Islam accepts an interpenetration of cult and power. The languages of Muslim countries have no words for “secularism” or “layman.”¹² Hinduism is very elastic on this matter: it has no corpus of dogma by which all Hindus must abide, and it certainly does not advance the principle that written Hindu texts constitute “the divine word.” In fact, there are so few accepted fundamentals that Hindu fundamentalism is probably an oxymoron.³³ However, the decentralized and nonclerical structure of Islam and Hinduism make them less theocratic than Catholicism. Moreover, the Judeo-Christian tradition has strong historical and theological links with Islam, and, again, differences can be matched by similarities. For instance, Lisa Anderson points to the desirability of harmonious regulation of the different orders of society in both Islamic and Catholic political teaching;³⁴ and Shireen T. Hunter argues that Judaism and Christianity, not only Islam, are in conflict with “absolute secularism.”³⁵

In sum, religious mobilization tends to be “antisystem”—at least in its discourse and during its initial stages. Although this stance is informed by particular interpretations of religious doctrine, it would be wrong to remain on the level of religious ideas and discourse. Instead of comparing religions as doctrines and discourse and making grand totalizing comparisons, it is preferable to focus on the actual practice of religious parties,³⁶ on existing political institutions, and on religious institutions.
2. The reconstruction of existing religious identities rather than their simple mobilization. Religious movements constitute a social and political phenomenon that cannot be reduced to the religions from which they sprang. While they emerge in the context of a broad societal religious revival, characterized by the enforcement of stricter standards of piety and the wide diffusion of religious symbols, they do not merely mobilize existing religious identities; they reconstruct them by blending religious, social, economic, and political concerns, by synthesizing traditional and modern appeals, and by mixing utopian millenarist messages with concrete political action. In short, these parties are not just an expression of dormant identities; they redefine these identities. In this sense, they are revolutionary and radical not just in the context of the political regimes within which they emerge and operate but also, and this is crucial and often overlooked, within the religious structure they claim to uphold and represent. Indeed, their practice more often than not diverges in significant ways from their religious matrices.

The Catholic movements that emerged in nineteenth-century Europe aspired to revive Catholicism and Christianize modernity in response to the rise of liberalism and the secularization of European states. Like Islam before its recent resurgence, Catholicism in nineteenth-century Europe was perceived as a declining and spent force, retreating in front of modernization. Yet it reemerged dramatically to challenge the established order. The revivalist and novel form of European Catholic movements has been stressed by many authors.

Islamism, a recent and modern phenomenon, emerged as a potent force in Muslim politics during the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, it is possible to speak of a resurgence of Islam in Muslim politics, an Islamic revival, or even an attempt to Islamize modernity. Islamism diverges from traditional Islam in that it is thoroughly modern in its leadership and organization and the articulation of its message. Islamist movements developed a new and modern form of organization based on the primary role of social and political action. Islamists creatively deploy selected elements of Islamic tradition to justify their actions. In contrast to traditional religious organizations, Sufi mystical brotherhoods, and ulama associations, modern Islamist organizations have a lay rather than clerical leadership and are urban based. The ulamas were often criticized for being too moderate. The Islamist thinker Ali Shariati argued that because the “return to Islam” was not a retreat to the
medieval Islamic worldview of conservative ulamas but a revolutionary vision of early Islam that would provide the inspirational basis for its modern re-
interpretation, it required Islamically oriented laymen with a knowledge and command of modern thought and methods.\textsuperscript{42}

Likewise, no unified Hindu movement existed until recently. A fore-
runner, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), emerged in 1964.\textsuperscript{43} It focused mostly on the provision of local social services but remained of limited importance.\textsuperscript{44} The Hindu movement really exploded in the 1980s, following a campaign of “Hindu extremism” that called for the demolition of the Babri mosque.\textsuperscript{45} Although there has always existed a committed core of Hindu nationalists, this movement has now broadened its base of support and has successfully converted citizens who previously remained on the periphery of the movement. The Hindu movement has transcended Hindu religion since this religion does not lend itself to organized movements. As in Islam, there is no central church or recognized clergy to lead a Hindu religious campaign. Rather there exists a wide range of religious specialists, including gurus of sects, temple priests, and wandering holy men. The BJP and its associated organizations have been extremely successful in reinterpreting Hindu religious teaching (mostly through the medium of a potent anti-Muslim message) and, through this reinterpretation, creating a powerful movement.

3. Mass mobilization relying on wide use of selective incentives and a concomitant focus on economic and social issues. Religious mobilization is almost always mass mobilization: religious parties share a grassroots character, the result of a pioneering use of techniques of mass mobilization. In turn, religious parties derive their strength from the creation of extensive mass organizations. The redefinition of religion is important because it is instrumental in generating mass mobilization. Yet, however important the religious message is, these parties rely as much if not more on social and political messages. In fact, religious messages act as a catalyst that mobilize a wide variety of economic and social concerns. Religious mobilization tends to take place in times of economic and social change and the concomitant processes of social dislocation and crisis.

The social profile of religious mobilization points to some important regularities. The state provides the main focus of criticism—be it the Masonic liberal bourgeoisie in Belgium or the state-rentier ones in Algeria
or India. Petty bourgeois urban and rural sectors threatened by economic modernization are mobilized against these states.\textsuperscript{16} Without generalizing too much, it is possible to remark that the "religious" cleavage also expresses the efforts of dominated actors (peasants and workers), who in alliance with the middle classes (small businessmen, low-level bureaucrats, and educated segments of the population) contest the hegemony of the ruling elites in the cultural and political arenas.\textsuperscript{17}

Religious parties solve the collective action problem not through abstract religious ideas but through selective incentives, centered mostly on the local provision of welfare services. They provide social services (hospitals, clinics, legal aid societies), sponsor economic projects (banks, credit and investment houses, insurance companies), education (schools, childcare centers, youth camps), and wide networks of religious publishing and broadcasting. In more than one way they substitute for the state. Contrary to what one might imagine, their leaders are often the very products of modernization—graduates of major universities in medicine, science, and engineering.\textsuperscript{18} The success they achieve in building mass organizations is reflected in the veritable countersocieties ("subcultures" or "milieus") that emerge as a result of their efforts.

Nineteenth-century European Catholic movements combined their message with the most sophisticated political weapons of the day, such as mass organization and partisan press. Hundred of associations were created, ranging from charitable neighborhood groups and moral leagues to Catholic worker clubs and credit associations. They were built outside liberal political institutions as a distinct Catholic countersociety that would eventually grow to submerge the liberal state. This dimension of the Catholic movement was reflected in the prominent role played by laymen and the lower clergy and their critique of the Catholic hierarchy for being too moderate and unwilling to engage in open political action. It was also embodied in a revolutionary form of organization, built outside the church's clerical structure, the mass organization of laymen.\textsuperscript{19} On the economic front, Catholic parties, such as the Belgian one, pitted a coalition of petty bourgeois urban and rural sectors threatened by economic modernization against a liberal bourgeoisie with close ties to the state.\textsuperscript{20} The Belgian Catholic movement was particularly successful in attracting working-class support.\textsuperscript{21}

Islamist movements share many of these elements. For example, the Algerian FIS, using both mosques and modern communications technology
to propagate its message, evolved into a mass movement thoroughly integrated into the fabric of Algerian society. It combined an electoralist and a grassroots strategy, weaving the fabric of a veritable countersociety. Groups such as charitable neighborhood associations were gradually transformed into FIS local cells. The party blended a critique of the existing regime with a utopian project: the Islamic solution and the Islamic state, concepts as vague as they are malleable. As Roy points out, the FIS mobilized the masses “around the myth of a return to an Islamic authenticity that never existed.” Although the FIS represented the urban poor, it would be wrong to view it only as a movement of the disenfranchised. The party enjoyed the support of peasants and workers who along with the middle strata, including small businessmen, low-level state functionaries, shop owners, lawyers, and teachers, overwhelmingly rejected the corrupt record of the governing party and the state-rentier elites.

Likewise, the BJP has built a mass following in close collaboration with Hindu movements such as the RSS, a martial organization promoting an exclusively Hindu definition of the Indian nation, and the VHP, which has been campaigning to liberate Hindu sites allegedly occupied by Muslim shrines. The RSS had 1.8 million members in 1989 in about twenty thousand base units (shakhas); the VHP boasted three thousand local branches and more than one million volunteer workers. The Vidyarthi Parishad is India’s largest student organization, and the Mazdoor Sangh has one of the largest memberships among competitive labor unions. The grassroots character of Hindu nationalism is impressive.

The BJP’s mobilizational muscle is largely due to its collaboration with these grassroots organizations. A study of the branch of the Hindu militant organization Shiv Sena in the state of Madhya Pradesh suggests that unemployment was the driving force behind BJP’s growth in membership. Generally, unemployed youth are among the biggest supporters of the party along with graduate Hindu upper-caste males of urban centers. According to Eric Kolodner, the BJP has proved successful because it addressed “material deprivation, psychological uncertainty, and ideological anomie,” it exploited the weaknesses of the Congress Party, and it promised to clean up politics and stabilize the country. According to Thomas Blom Hansen, Hindu nationalism emerged and took shape primarily in civil society.

Ironically, religious movements have come to embody a condition deemed necessary for democratization, namely, the rise in civil society of a
counterelite. Yet the alternative culture that inspires many if not most religious movements is one opposed to liberal democracy—as is clear from even a cursory reading of their programs and declarations.

4. **Cross-class appeal.** The strength of social and economic factors underlying religious mobilization should not lead to the (Marxist) mistake of claiming that religion is just a cover for what is really a class cleavage. True, the features of religious mobilization I have discussed parallel those of class mobilization. Socialist parties rejected liberal democracy and built mass parties combining selective incentives and a utopian message of class equality. What sets religious mobilization apart from class mobilization, however, is its cross-class appeal. The social heterogeneity of religious parties, their cross-class basis, and their ability to weave together disparate or even competing social groups have been underlined by many authors. Initially this task appears impossible to some observers. For example, Paul Brass has argued that “the BJP cannot integrate upper castes and backward castes in a consolidated Hindu party.” Yet this party managed to build such a coalition, as evidenced by survey data.

Although it would be a mistake to reject religion as a mere cover for class mobilization, it would likewise be wrong to assume that cross-class appeal implies that class ceases to be a salient cleavage. Although class is deemphasized and redefined by religious parties, it does not lose its saliency. In fact, class becomes salient within the party. In seeking to manage their party organization and accommodate their diverse clientele, religious parties have developed remarkable skills of class mediation (often wrongly attributed exclusively to doctrines such as “social Catholicism”). The redefinition of class identities takes place within the party and is often reflected in the federative nature of the party organization. Many European Catholic parties adopted such an organization: in Belgium, for instance, the party was a federation of various organizations defined in class terms (workers, peasants, middle classes), called *standen*. Likewise, the BJP relies on a quasi-federative structure as well, in which grassroots organizations, such as the VHP and the RSS, retain their organizational autonomy. Such a structure favors a segmented set of appeals with organizations specializing in particular class target groups. For example, the Shiva Sena in Bombay and the Hindu Ekata Andolan in other parts of the Maharashtrian state have targeted the needs of the lower castes and classes, whereas the BJP proper
addresses the economic needs of the middle and upper classes, whose interests often conflict with the lower-caste Indians.69

PATHS OUT OF UNSECULAR POLITICS

Religious mobilization is often initiated by preexisting religious institutions—churches and various religious authorities. Although these institutions often lose their ability to determine the course of religious movements and parties, the relations between the two are both a crucial feature that sets religious mobilization apart from other kinds of mobilization and an essential element in understanding how unsecular politics become secularized.

Identifying the common elements of religious mobilization is a way to address the issue of the incorporation of religious parties into liberal-democratic institutional frameworks. Indeed, the primary reason that the recent seemingly global wave of religious mobilization has attracted attention is the perception that it poses a threat and that this threat cannot be analyzed in a social science context. According to Stanley J. Tambiah:

In the late twentieth century, a surprising number of militant and seemingly “irrational” eruptions have occurred. They challenge the confident post-Enlightenment prophecies that the decline of religion was inevitable, or that at best, it could only survive in a demythologized form; that primordial loyalties and sentiments would fade into oblivion as national integration took effect, or be carried away as flotsam by the currents of world historical process. These violent and ubiquitous explosions also challenge and strain our conventional social science explanations of order, disorder, and conflict.70

There is little doubt that the antiliberal and antisecular message of religious mobilization is a potential threat for emerging democracies. As Kolodner puts it, “India raises the issue of the responsibility a democratic state possesses to accommodate avowedly anti-democratic forces, that is, whether there should exist a limit to democratic tolerance, and whether the threshold should be lower in recently democratized countries, whose systems might be more susceptible to manipulative and ultimately destructive forces.”71 However, to acknowledge the existence of a potential threat is
hardly sufficient. We need to specify the conditions under which religious parties will be willing and able (or not) to moderate and incorporate successfully in emerging democracies. Parties relying on religious mobilization face two major decisions: (a) whether to moderate, that is, decrease, the saliency of their religious goals and accept operating within competitive and secular institutional frames and (b) if yes, how to moderate successfully. Specifying the conditions of moderation qualifies the alarmist discourse about the rise of religious mobilization. This is precisely where a reconsideration of the legacy of Christian Democracy can be most instructive and fruitful.

Here I sketch a framework that addresses these issues. I argue that religious parties are generally willing to moderate because of a number of electoral and nonelectoral constraints. However, their ability to moderate is far more variable. Moreover, I argue that decisions about the paths that lead out of unsecular politics are typically incremental and independent of the party's ideology; they are, instead, far more dependent on the form of political and religious institutions (and institutional constraints) faced by the party in question.

Willingness to Moderate

Like most parties, religious parties are seldom monolithic. They are typically divided into moderate and radical factions. Typically, moderates control the party's leadership, whereas radicals are strong at the grass roots. The first question is, when will the moderates push for a moderate revision of their program? The main incentive for moderation is the possibility of access to power. Although the rise of new parties (of any kind) tends to be fueled by antisystem positions, the realization that power is within reach creates the incentive to moderate so as to appeal to broader sections of the electorate. There are two categories of constraints likely to induce processes of moderation, electoral and nonelectoral ones.

Electoral constraints

The electoral performance of religious parties tends to follow the general rule according to which parliamentary one-party majorities are hard to attain. Thus they typically have to ally with nonreligious parties to form a government. These allies typically demand from the religious party and are
in a position to obtain moderation. Moderation induced by electoral constraints can be stable (by emerging as a new equilibrium) as was the case in nineteenth-century Belgium; even when the initial incentives for moderation are conjunctural; of course, an absence of structural incentives may prove unstable.

Moderation as a result of electoral constraints was the path followed by most Catholic parties in nineteenth-century Europe. I illustrate this path by using evidence from India. In 1996, for the first time in India’s history, a militant Hindu party found itself in a position to govern the country. Its first opportunity lasted only thirteen days. Nevertheless, the party performed very well in the 1998 elections and led a seventeen-party coalition government. This government lasted for thirteen months, until April 1998, when it lost a vote of confidence because of a defection. New elections were called, and the BJP led a twenty-four-party coalition to a decisive victory.

The rise of the BJP took place in the context of widespread religious polarization and violence, triggered by grassroots Hindu organizations. Indeed, the prospect of a BJP-led government in 1996 caused great alarm, both in India and abroad. High uncertainty prevailed: “As the BJP’s countdown to taking power commence[d], India [was] bracing itself for the most significant and uncertain fortnight in its political history.” This prospect aroused fears among both members of the one hundred-million strong Muslim minority and secular Hindus. The Indian historian Romilla Thapar argued, “It is in the nature of their kind of ideology to intimidate their enemies. . . . It will be extremely difficult for liberal elements if the BJP forms a government.”

Opinions about the exact course of action that the BJP would follow were divided. Many believed that the moderates in the party (like its veteran politician and candidate for prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee) would follow the vociferous extremist wing of the Hindu grassroots organizations. The statements of Bal Thackeray, a radical leader who had threatened “anarchy” if the BJP was not chosen to form India’s government, seemed to support such expectations.

However, others came to the conclusion that the BJP’s accession to power would, in fact, bring moderation: “It’s better that they’re in power,” argued a Muslim. “Now they won’t resort to the kind of fanaticism they used to. They’ll be saner and won’t tear down any more mosques.” Many Muslim intellectuals and leaders thought that the harsh realities of power
would make the BJP "behave differently in office"; they "concluded that things are not as bad as that. Any menace from a BJP government may be short-lived, they said, because the party had not rallied a parliamentary majority behind it." The BJP "strove to project itself as a moderate, inclusionary force capable of forging a national consensus and furnishing stability at the center." In a televised interview soon after he was named prime minister for the first time, Vajpayee declared that the first BJP government would not mean a radical shift. The country, he pointed out, would remain secular, and Muslims, 11 percent of the population, should not fear discrimination. "Hinduism will not be the state religion," he added. Moreover, BJP president Lal Krishna Advani made a stark declaration: "We are committed to secularism."

The trend toward moderation was confirmed in the following years, culminating in the electoral victory of the BJP-led alliance in October 1999. The party formed a coalition with secular partners; in exchange for their support, the party "promised that it [would] not pursue the agenda that had raised the hackles of Muslims and secularists alike." Indeed, the electoral campaigns it ran were largely free of ideology, and the BJP resorted to strategies of moderation at the state level. Following the party's decisive victory, the New York Times ran the following editorial comment: "[Mr. Vajpayee has] managed to rid his party of some of its Hindu chauvinist reputation by agreeing not to institute the party's most virulent anti-Muslim measures." Likewise, the international media recognized the party's move toward moderation. According to The Economist:

The BJP rose to national prominence in the early 1990s on a programme of Hindutva—Hinduness—and attracted zealots who wanted to tear down Muslim mosques and erect Hindu temples in their place, notably in Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. But, recognising that it could not form a government alone, the BJP fought this election as the leader of the 24-party National Democratic Alliance, whose manifesto promised a moratorium on "contentious" issues such as the building of the temple at Ayodhya.

Those who had previously brushed aside any prospect of moderation for the BJP now recognized that "[t]he logic of Indian politics has made it clear to the BJP that if they want to be in power they must find enough
coalition partners in the South and East, which is impossible without ideological moderation." The BJP’s platform attempted a tightrope walk between hard-line and moderate factions, but the direction of the tilt was clearly toward greater moderation. Pratap B. Mehta summarizes this remarkable trajectory:

The rigors of the democratic process have chastened the BJP and led it to try to smooth down some of its rougher edges. It has bent over backwards to project itself as a moderate party of the center right, capable of being inclusive and providing good governance. In the states where it holds power—Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra—it has indeed behaved like a moderate party that recognizes good governance as the key to staying in office. It has relied less on ominous rhetoric of Hindu self-assertion, and moderates in its ranks have been in the driver’s seat.

It is particularly interesting to note here that Vajpayee’s political career began in the grassroots Hindu movement: he joined the fundamentalist Hindu organization RSS and worked as a journalist in the RSS magazine Rashtradharam. Examples of Islamist parties that have appeared willing to moderate under similar constraints are those in Jordan and Pakistan.

Nonelectoral constraints
What happens when religious parties manage to win parliamentary majorities? The “safety valve” of minority governments is obviously not available and secular minorities feel threatened. These situations are described as follows:

Secularism is the dream of a minority which wants to shape the majority in its own image, which wants to impose its will upon history but lacks the power to do so under a democratically organized polity. In an open society the state will reflect the character of the society. Secularism therefore is a social myth which draws a cover over the failure of this minority to separate politics from religion in the society in which its members live.

Similar statements can be made about nineteenth-century Belgium and other Catholic countries in Europe, with the exception of France, and many contemporary Muslim societies.
Because many religious parties operate in the semiauthoritarian environments of countries undergoing democratization, they face heavy non-electoral constraints. A central constraint is the fact that ruling elites control or are closely associated with military establishments. When this is the case victorious religious parties will have to become moderate to accede to power, otherwise the military will be likely to subvert their victory (and the process of democratization). Belgium in 1884 and Algeria in 1992 are cases in which the structure of choices facing the political actors conformed to this situation: religious majorities with no military might faced ruling minorities with military might. In Belgium democratization succeeded but not in Algeria.\textsuperscript{96}

Ability to Moderate

As Roberto Michels pointed out a long time ago, if the (moderate) leadership of a party is willing to push for a less radical agenda, it has the means to impose its will on radicals.\textsuperscript{96} Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca has developed a long-overdue formal model that explores how moderates tackle this task with respect to their radical rank and file and voters and shows how they succeed.\textsuperscript{97} However, in situations in which victorious religious parties face hostile military establishments, it is the religious parties’ ability rather than their given willingness to moderate that matters.

I have argued elsewhere that ex ante credible signaling of ex post victory behavior is of crucial importance in the successful outcome of democratization processes where religious actors win parliamentary majorities.\textsuperscript{98} Unfortunately, the moderate leadership of young parties may have the willingness to moderate but lack the ability to silence the radicals and to send the right kind of explicit and unambiguous signals that will satisfy ruling elites. A solution to this problem can be provided by religious institutions. Centralized, authoritarian, and hierarchical religious institutions can have a positive effect by shouldering the responsibility of silencing the radicals. The empirical prediction here is that Catholic movements should be more successful than Islamist or Hindu movements to send credible signals. Hence unambiguous electoral victories that make one-party cabinets possible in Islamic countries or India will be likely to fit the alarmists’ expectations. This was the case in Algeria but not in India, where the BJP did not win a parliamentary majority.
A final caveat is warranted: a religious party might be willing and able to moderate yet still be excluded from power. The Welfare Party in Turkey is such an instance. In semiauthoritarian regimes, ruling elites have the option to shut out of power religious parties that threaten their hold on power. In such situations, the outcome is independent of the religious parties' strategy—or of religious mobilization altogether.

CONCLUSION

The European Christian Democratic experience can be integrated into a comparative approach that stresses actors and institutions. This approach has a triple advantage. First, it dodges the pitfalls of deadend dichotomous debates on ideologies and theologies. By bypassing the issue of political theology, it is possible to focus on issues that are otherwise overlooked: instead of concentrating on whether a religious ideology is structurally compatible with democracy, the analysis has to focus on the nontrivial issue of how and when religious parties moderate. Second, this approach generates empirical predictions such as the ones I have suggested; these predictions qualify the prevalent indiscriminate alarmism about the rise of religious “fundamentalist” parties. Third, by pointing to the importance of religious institutions, this approach reintroduces (and reconceptualizes) religion in social science investigation where it continues to remain absent. Fourth, this approach suggests that the legacy of European Christian Democracy transcends its temporal and spatial boundaries and carries a more universal significance—both for politics and for political science research.

NOTES

1. I thank Kanchan Chandra for comments and Caroleen Marji for research assistance.


4. For opposite interpretations of similar statements by Islamist leaders, see John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East," in Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, ed. Ghassan Salamé (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1944), 40; and François Burgat, L'Islamisme en face (Paris: La Découverte, 1996), 14–15. Likewise, ideology can be a flawed predictor of foreign policy. According to Roy, the "cultural opposition [of Islamic states] to the West is unrelated to the strategic choices made by states. Anti-Christian attitudes and discourse reach their highest pitch among the Saudis, who strategically are in the western camp, but who forbid the erection of churches on their soil, whereas Iran never had an anti-Christian political position and has always accepted a certain Christian visibility (to the point of authorizing the Armenians to make wine)." Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).


33. Kolodner uses these features to claim that the Hindu movement is fundamentally different from the Islamist movement—another example of a flawed noncomparative inference. “Political Economy,” 236.
36. The usefulness of a comparison of Islamism and political Catholicism is hinted at (but not pursued) by some students of Middle East politics, such as Roy, Failure of Political Islam; Ghassan Salamé, “Introduction: Where are the Democrats?” in Salamé Democracy without Democrats? 9; and Gudrun Krämer, “The Integration of the Integristes: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia,” in Salamé, Democracy without Democrats? 204.
38. This is consistent with Mark Tessler and Jodi Nachtwey’s finding from survey data that there is a clear empirical distinction between the personal and political dimensions of religion. “Islam and Attitude toward International Conflict: Evidence from Survey Research in the Arab World,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:5 (1998): 634.
43. The RSS was launched in 1925, and the VHP was initially its affiliate. However, its founder, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, was not religious and kept the RSS away from religious activities, a tradition that only recently has been discarded. Walter Andersen, “Many Faces of Hindu Nationalism,” paper presented at the South Asia Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1994, 3.


50. Falter, “De Kamerverkiezingen van 10 juni 1884.”


52. Roy, Failure of Political Islam, 4.


55. Roy, Failure of Political Islam, 195.


64. Labat, Les islamistes Algériens, 184; Els Witte and Jan Craeybeckx, La Belgique politique de 1830 à nos jours: Les tensions d’une démocratie bourgeoise (Brussels: Editions Labor, 1987), 87; Kolodner, “Political Economy,” 243.


69. Ibid., 243.


74. Chandra and Parmar, "Party Strategies," 214–22, argue that the BJP had the weakest incentives to retain its moderate strategy in Uttar Pradesh after the 1996 elections. Yet three years later it apparently followed the same moderate strategy.


76. Founded in April 1980, the BJP grew from only 2 seats in the 545-seat lower house in 1984 (7.4 percent of the popular vote) to 88 in 1989, 119 in 1991 (21 percent of the popular vote), 194 in 1996 (together with its declared allies; 160 on its own; 23.5 percent of the popular vote), 182 seats in 1998, and 294 seats in 1999 (as a 24-party coalition; 182 on its own), making it the largest single party in India. At the same time, the party achieved considerable success in state elections, at some point ruling over an area containing as much as one-third of the Indian electorate.

77. Zubrzycki, "Hindu Nationalists Rule India."

78. Ibid.


81. Quoted in Dahlburg, "India's Muslims Both Anxious, Hopeful," 8.

82. Dahlburg, "India's Muslims Both Anxious, Hopeful."


88. Chandra and Parmar (“Party Strategies,” 217) list the steps that the BJP took toward moderation. It chose an unimpeachably secular rather than a pro-Hindu party as an alliance partner; it did not make the construction of the Ram temple a central issue, even in the constituency of Ayodhya; there was no statewide coordination with the VHP, and several VHP leaders were kept away from the party’s electoral rallies. They conclude that the BJP “had now regulated the mention of its own Hindu identity to a barely perceptible whisper.”


90. Economist, October 9, 1999.


94. T.N. Madan, “Secularism in Its Place,” Journal of Asian Studies 46:4 (1987): 748–49; the statement is about India, where it is questionable whether antisecularism is majoritarian.

95. Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies.”


98. Kalyvas, “Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies.”

99. A recent survey of 727 articles published in leading journals of comparative politics between 1982 and 1996 found that religion is among the most underdeveloped issues of “prime importance.” Adrian Prentice Hull, “Comparative Political Science: An Inventory and Assessment since the 1980s,” PS: Political Science and Politics 23:1 (1999): 123.